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The purpose of the study is to reveal characteristics of the strategic cultures in 
Britain, France, and Germany as the major member states of the European Union (EU). 
Assuming that national differences can be detected, the study proceeds in assessing 
whether there is an opportunity to reconcile them, or even to establish a European 
paradigm of strategic thinking as a core element of the Common Security and Defense 
Policy of the EU. Based on the interpretation of Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy 
in Britain, France, and Germany, main commonalities and diversities in strategic thinking 
are discussed. Analyzing, on the international and state level, why Clausewitz has been 
misunderstood, this study establishes Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy as the 
theoretical framework of strategy-making within the EU. The fruitfulness of the 
Clausewitzian paradigm is shown in two areas: first, Clausewitzs theoretical approach 
assists in gaining an improved understanding of the political and military strategic 
environment of the EU; second, it provides awareness of the challenges given with 
multinationality as a strategic principle of the EU. Finally, Clausewitzs theory allows 
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This study reveals characteristics of the strategic cultures in Britain, France, and 
Germany as the major member states of the European Union (EU). Assuming that 
national differences can be detected, the study proceeds in assessing whether there is an 
opportunity to reconcile them, or even to establish a European paradigm of strategic 
thinking as a core element of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU. Based 
on the interpretation of Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy in Britain, France, and 
Germany, main commonalities and diversities in strategic thinking are discussed.  
The main conclusion is that Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy has the 
potential to establish the desirable European strategic paradigm. The superiority of 
Clausewitzs theory results from its comprehensiveness that is founded on exceptional 
personal experience and mind, broad historical evidence, and deep theoretical reflections 
that includes philosophy of science. By this, Clausewitz might help to prevent the 
military from establishing autonomous or elite strategic concepts that are justified by 
timeless military principles; instead, he makes war and strategy subject to the rational 
discourse of all social players involved, thus covering all dimensions of strategy-making. 
To take advantage of the fruitfulness of Clausewitzs scientific approach and his 
propositions on war and strategy, politicians, officials, and commanders must understand 
his theoretical writings. Strategy-makers are encouraged to critically reflect upon their 
own strategic thinking by confronting it with Clausewitzs entire theory of war and 
strategy. To practice this critical method, two prerequisites are necessary: first, the proper 
education of strategists that includes the ability to critically reflect upon ones own 
 xii
strategic mind, and cooperation in the strategy-making process that includes scholars with 
expertise in the theory and history of strategy-making.  
With the European integration process, most reasons for differences between the 
British and the continental way of warfare and strategy have been abolished. Certainly, 
Britain has conducted the most radical shift in strategy-making. However, the traditional 
British approach of indirectness finds a strong European expression in the broad security 
concept of the EU that comprises a wide spectrum of civilian means and coordinates 
them closely with the conduct of military operations at the strategic level. Furthermore, 
the EU benefits from the strong British political culture of political supremacy and inter-
agency cooperation in strategy-making. Undoubtedly, the British approach is in line with 
the conclusions Clausewitz draws in his theoretical writings. Paradoxically, if the 
additional British tradition of trashing Clausewitz can be overcome, Britain has the 
capacity to prevent its EU partners from continuing to understand Clausewitz in the one-
dimensional continental way that traditionally focuses more at the operational and tactical 
level of warfare. 
 Strategically, the EU is both, a continental and a naval power. Tactically, the 
European Rapid Reaction Forces (ERRF) are designed as a corps-sized military 
formation enabled to conduct joint operations. However, because of the limited number 
of forces assigned to the EU, the capabilities for power projection are rather limited. Even 
if the EU military force strength is likely to be increased in the future, its military 
operations will depend on NATO for the foreseeable future. This is not so much because 
of the lack of planning capabilities or the technology gap but rather because of the 
necessity to be prepared for escalation scenarios. Consequently, EU strategy-makers need 
 xiii
to establish strong institutional and personal links to NATO, thereby facing the dilemma 
of a successful EU undermining the relevance of NATO in the field of crisis management 
operations. 
Implementing the EU strategy-making as an inter-governmental and not supra-
governmental process, EU strategy-makers encounter enormous complexity. Like NATO, 
the EU will, most probably, face crises. The successful management of internal crises 
depends primarily on the leadership behavior of Britain and France; on the ability of the  
commander of the ERRF to create trust among the force contributing countries; and on 
the European identity of the people of the European states, including the soldiers. 
Nevertheless, the strong dependence on national policies and politics as well as the 
inexperienced co-leadership of Britain and France put a burden on the capability of the 






























I. INTRODUCTION  
 
One major subject of the ongoing European unification process is the 
harmonization of classical strategic thought of the European nation states. In the end, 
different national traditions in strategic thinking, if not reflected upon and, as far as 
possible, reconciled, might create obstacles for the efforts of the European Union in 
establishing and implementing European military strategies. Consequently, before 
officials and officers from the EUs troop-contributing nations to the European military 
forces start to cooperate in developing strategic concepts, it is reasonable to reflect upon 
the strategic understanding they carry with them. 
 
 
A. SCENARIO  
 
With a widely unexpected pace, the European Union (EU) has integrated Western 
and Central Europe since its first institution, the European Community for Steal and Coal 
(ECSC), was founded in 1950.1 After having dealt with purely economic questions for 
more than 30 years, the EU widened its areas of cooperation to those fields of policies 
that are supposed to be at the core of the nation states sovereignty, in particular the 
foreign policy. Apparently, authority to implement foreign policies has not been extended 
to supranational institutions; and up to now, the intention of creating an European Army 
                                                 
1 Information about the history of the EU provide Oudenaren, John van, A History of Three Treaties, 
in Ronald Tiersky (ed.), Europe Today, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford, 1999, pp. 241-272; 
McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union, Palgrave, 1999, pp. 57-86. The envisioned 
enlargement of the EU to Central Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe is discussed in Sedelmeier, 
Ulrich, Wallace, Helen, Eastern Enlargement, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (ed.), Policy-
Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 427-460. 
2 
has been denied by all nations involved.2 Nevertheless, with the concepts of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common European Security and Defense 
Policy (CESDP)3, the EU agreed on the intergovernmental harmonization of all member 
states foreign, security and defense policies. Since 1997, Henry Kissingers famous, and 
rather cynical, question, When I want to speak to Europe, whom do I call? has found a 
first answer with the implementation of the High Representative for a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP).4 In addition, the characterization of the EU as ... an 
economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm5 has been erased by the 
establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that is scheduled to be 
operational ready in the year 2003.6 Today, the EU appears to be firmly committed to the 
project of the CESDP, even in such a way that it is willing to risk major disputes against 
the US for its relationship with NATO. 
Therefore, imagine the following scenario: until 2003, the EU establishes the 
military forces capable for autonomous action7 and the required political-military 
                                                 
2 However, the degree of denial differs among the European states involved. Very strong is the British 
denial (Oates, Mark, European Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, International Affairs and 
Defense Section, House of Commons, Research Paper 00/20, 21.02.2000, p. 35). 
3 The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the EU under the Treaty of Maastricht. This treaty 
defined the objective of the union in external policy as assert its identity on the international scene, in 
particular, through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual 
framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense (TEU, Article 
B). For discussion see Forster, Anthony, Wallace, William, Common Foreign and Security policy. 
From Shadow to Substance?, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (ed.), Policy-Making in the 
European Union, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 461-491. 
4 Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Article 18, p. 119. Mr. Javier Solana, appointed as Mr 
CFSP in 1999, additionally later became the Secreatary-General of the WEU (Oakes, European 
Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, pp. 25-27). 
5 McCormick, Understanding the European Union, p. 206. 
6 The French President Chirac and the British Prime Minister Blair at the Anglo-French Summit at St. 
Malo laid the roots for the establishment of the ERRF in November 1998. After several EU meetings, 
the ERRF were announced at the Helsinki European Council summit in December 1999. For more 
information see chapter IV. 
7 Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, 
3 
decision-making structure, including the capability for military strategic planning.8 In 
order to prevent unnecessary duplication of command structures, the EU absorbs the 
Western European Union (WEU) and agrees with NATO on cooperation in crises 
management operations. Although NATO has agreed to provide the military planning 
capabilities on the strategic and operational level9, the EU, pursuing a broad approach in 
crisis management, builds up its own institutions for strategic decision-making 
integrating political, military, civilian security, economic and ecological means and 
establishing close cooperation with International Organizations (IO) and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO).10 Operating with close support from NATO 
headquarters, EU military strategic decision-making institutions provide the required 
advice to the heads of states and the national representatives within the structure of the 
European Council. However, due to the internal dynamic of the European integration 
process11, the EU proceeds to increase planning capacities that  under the principles of 
cooperation and transparency with NATO  would enable it to conduct military 
operations without relying on NATO headquarters. 
                                                 
 
available (online): http://www.fco.gov.uk.news/newstext.asp?1795, p. 1 (02.02.01). Action comprises 
military operations that are, as defined in the Petersberg Declaration in 1992 and confirmed in the 
Kirchbach Declaration in 1995, limited to humanitarian intervention, crisis management, 
peacekeeping, including peacemaking if required. 
8 Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999 in Oates, 
European Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, p. 24.  
9 The agreement reached in Washington in 1999 is a follows: We therefore stand ready to define and 
adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and 
capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as 
an Alliance (NATO Summit Communiqué of 24 April 1999, item 10, available (online): 
http://www.nato.int) (February 2001).  
10 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 in Oates, European 
Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, p. 32. 
11 Theories of integration with regard to the EU are discussed in McCormick, Understanding the 
European Union, Palgrave, 1999, pp. 9-20; Robert, Cottrell, Europe: So Far, It Flies, in The New 
York Review, 8 April 1999, p. 72. According to Cottrell, the dis-equilibrium dynamics of European 
4 
With this scenario becoming reality in the first decade of the 21st century, the 
question arises, what challenges civilian and military personnel working in EU 
institutions responsible for strategic planning have to face when developing a general 
military strategy for the EU and specific military strategies for single crisis scenarios. 
Generally, the most favorable condition is if the personnel involved in strategic planning 
share the same assumptions and propositions about strategy. At the a look, a broad 
consensus about military strategy seems to exist among officials and officers from those 
EU member states that are simultaneously members of NATO. Seen through the screen 
of the constructivist theory of international relations12, NATO has had a socializing 
impact on its member states, not only with regard to their democratic culture and values 
but also with regard to military strategic thinking and planning.13 The socializing 
function of NATO is, in particular, caused by the consensus principle of decision-making 
within NATO. Consequently, representatives of all member states have had the 
opportunity to participate proactively in political and military strategic planning and 
decision-making. Therefore, communicating and cooperating within NATO could even 
have possessed the quality of arguing14 that educates participants in discovering the 
                                                 
 
integration encourages the nations to initiate the next step once a project is finished. Others call this the 
bicycle theory of integration: move forward, or fall over. 
12 Finnemore, Martha, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca/London, 1996. 
13 Thomas points out the paradigmatic shift of strategy-making in Europe: The notion that European 
states would forgo attempts to maintain or create a complete military establishment was a radical 
departure from past practice. This period (early 50s; U.H.) marks the emergence of NATO as a 
transnational institution, and is an early indication of the alliances remarkable ability to forge 
consensus, overturn long-standing tradition, and identify and nurture common interests (Thomas, Ian 
Q.R., The Promise of Alliance. NATO and the political Imagination, Lanham/Boulder/New 
York/Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997, p. 30). During the Gulf War in 1991, 
wherever possible, NATO procedures were used. That helped the ad hoc alliance to fight as a coherent 
unit (p. 159). 
14 Risse, Thomas, Lets argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics. In: International 
Organization 54, 1, Winter 2000, pp. 7-39. 
5 
truth rather than to pursue pure national interests.15 In general, the EU can take advantage 
of the experience its personnel gained through active participation in the strategic 
decision-making processes of NATO. 
However, several arguments exist that might question the assumed consensus on 
assumptions and propositions about strategy. First, the developments of the alliances 
strategies16 have been dominated by the US. Providing the highest amount of resources to 
implement the different strategic concepts of NATO, in particular with regard to the 
nuclear deterrence17, the US continuously maintains its dominance over the strategic 
discussions and decisions until today.18 Consequently, the Europeans became used to 
coordinating their defense policies within the NATO framework, guided by US 
leadership19. With regard to the EUs security and defense institutions, however, a 
hegemon that guides the direction of discussions and covers disputes is not likely to 
emerge.  
Secondly, national strategies always had been decisive means of the European 
nation states to gain superiority in the European political and military antagonism, in 
                                                 
15 De Wyck, for example, describes the brainstorming sessions of NATO that aimed to develop a new 
strategic concept in the early 90s. De Wyck, Rob, NATO on the Brink of the new Millenium, London: 
Brasseys (UK) Ltd, 1997, pp. 20-47. 
16 Pedlow, Gregory W., The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949  1969, Brussels, 1997. 
17 Consequently, during the Cold War, the strategic discussion was mainly focused on the nuclear 
strategy. As Reid argues, many leading commentators in the realm of strategy were civilian academics 
that were not interested in military doctrine. This lead to a separation of strategic studies from the 
conduct of war in a classical that is conventional sense. In the end, there are really no military 
intellectuals dealing with strategy that could cooperate with the civilian academics. See Reid, Brian 
Holden, Studies in British Military Thought, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998, pp. XI, 12, 
and 93. This again supports the purpose of this study.  
18 Jordan, Robert, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander, London/New York, 2000; 
Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, pp. 45-46.  
19 McCormick, Understanding the European Union, p. 210. 
6 
particular in the Franco-German rivalry.20 Although a Europe-wide discussion on 
strategic issues has been established since the 18th century21, strategy was a matter of 
utmost national security. Consequently, a strong tradition of strategy-making ruled in the 
European states prohibiting them from establishing combined strategic planning and 
strategy-making. For example, France and Britain, although facing Germany as a 
common military threat, were, neither in 1914 nor in 1939/40, willing to build up 
common strategic planning elements.22  
Third, experience in defining national strategies of the major EU member states 
has been quite different. One example is the nuclear strategy. While Germany has not 
possessed nuclear weapons under national control23, France and Great Britain built up 
and maintained substantial nuclear forces.24 However, while Britain decided to cooperate 
closely with the US (and that means with NATO, too) in all affairs concerning nuclear 
strategy25, France used its nuclear force as a symbol of national independence, 
specifically from any US influence.26  
Another example of different experiences among the European nations is their 
participation in warfare between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War. 
                                                 
20 Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p. 99. 
21 At the end of the 18th century, for example, theoretical writings of Frederick the Great were 
translated into English (Luvaas, Jay, Preface, in Frederick the Great on the Art of War, ed. and trans. 
by Jay Luvaas, New York: Da Capo Press, 1999, pp. VII-VIII. 
22 Instead, Britain decided to cooperate closely with the US in strategy-making. This cooperation 
already started in World War I, and was improved in World War II. More details in Parker, R.A.C.: 
The Second World War, Oxford/New York, 1990, pp. 115-130. Also the German-Italian-Japanese 
alliance suffered from poor strategic coordination. 
23 Jordan, Norstad, p. 109. 
24 Unterseher, Lutz, Europes Armed Forces at the Millenium: A Case Study of Change in France, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany, 46 p., available (online): http://www.comw.org/pda/9911eur.html 
(March 2001). 
25 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, p. 75. 
26 Jordan, Norstad, pp. 118-132. 
7 
Germany, the major land force on the continent, was not involved in any warfare 
operations at all. Having assigned all major military formations to NATO, Germany did 
not even establish strategic or operational planning capabilities. By contrast, France and 
Britain fought wars independent from NATO, for example the Suez-Campaign in 1956 or 
the Falkland-War in 1982. Furthermore, both countries were heavily engaged in the 
process of de-colonization in the 50s and 60s.27 Evidently, France and Britain have 
maintained powerful institutions containing rich experience in national military strategy- 
making; these institutions have established strong traditions with significant intellectual 
impacts, in particular on the education of future strategists. 
To conclude, although different experiences of European states might be 
favorable for military strategic planning and decision-making within the EU, evidence is 
significant suggesting that the strategic cultures28 of the most powerful EU member states 
have, in spite of the common NATO experience, developed quite differently. 
Consequently, it seems to be a sound endeavor to investigate the national differences in 
strategic thinking, and to proof whether it is possible to establish a European strategic 
community operating with a common strategic paradigm29. Fundamentally, if the main 
national differences in strategic theory are not known and cannot be overcome, 
understanding and consensus-building within the EUs strategic planning and decision-
making institutions might be rendered more difficult. 
                                                 
27 Keylor, William R., The Twentieth-Century World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 
298-299, and 410-427; Carver, Michael, Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age, in Peter Paret 
(ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986,  pp. 779-814. 
28 Following Gray, strategic culture ... consists of the socially constructed and transmitted 
assumptions, habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation  that is, behavior  that 
are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community (Gray, Colin S., 
Modern Strategy, Oxford: University Press, 1999, p. 28). The categories of strategic culture are 
described on pp. 148-150. 
8 
Difficulties in mutual understanding and consensual agreements will definitely 
increase if the first detectable trends of re-nationalization continue. The end of the Cold 
War forced all European nation states to put more emphasis on the operational and 
strategic level of warfare. Obviously, this was done by referring to those theorists and 
practitioners whom the national military history offers. At the German Armed Command 
and General Staff Academy, education of future general staff officers in strategy focused 
mainly on Clausewitz and Moltke. The first Führerreise of the Army Chief of Staff of 
the Bundeswehr, conducted in 1999, aimed to educate generals and general staff officers 
in the art of operational warfare as taught by Clausewitz. In Britain, by contrast, Fuller 
and Liddell Hart were announced as the heroes for British officers30. Being aware of the 
power of tradition and the impact of rhetoric on strategic thinking, the nation states 
reference to a specific, national strategist to guide the current reform of the national 
military system appears to be counterproductive to the challenge of elaborating a 
common strategy for the European military forces. 
In the end, national traditions in strategic thinking, if not reflected upon and, as 
far as possible, reconciled, might create obstacles for the EUs efforts in establishing and 
implementing European military strategies. Consequently, before officials and officers 
from the EUs troop-contributing nations to the European military forces start to 
                                                 
 
29 Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1967. 
30 Moore-Bick, John, Die britische Sichtweise, in Schössler, Dietmar (ed.), Die Entwicklung des 
Strategie- und Operationsbegriffes seit Clausewitz. Militärisch-wissenschaftliches Colloquium der 
Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V. am 06. und 07. April 1995 in Dresden, Universität der Bundeswehr 
München, München, 1997, pp. 65-72. See also Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p. 231: The 
British army today seems to have embraced Fullers thinking with a certain degree of gusto that 
occasionally leaves me feeling uncomfortable. 
9 
cooperate in developing strategic concepts, it is reasonable to reflect upon the strategic 




Out of the fundamental assumption of the philosophical hermeneutics that, even 
in revolutionary times, there survives a good deal of old thinking31, this study asks 
whether different traditions of strategic thinking in Europe have existed. Assuming that 
national differences can be detected, the study proceeds in assessing whether there is an 
opportunity to reconcile them32, or even to establish a European paradigm of strategic 
thinking. Many different ways can investigate the differences of strategic traditions in the 
European states. One useful way is to analyze the current strategic concepts of France, 
Britain and other EU countries that have an explicit strategy33 Another way is the 
empirical research of the strategic mind of those civilian and military personnel 
assigned to work in the strategic departments of the EU military headquarters, asking for 
the strategic assumptions and propositions they believe in or are convinced of. A third 
sensible approach is the analysis of the different curricula of the national universities and 
military educational institutions.  
This study does not attempt to analyze the strategic thinking within the European 
nations empirically. There is neither an investigation of the thinking tools British, French 
                                                 
31 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, (deutsch: Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen 1980). 
32 As the German general Hans-Henning von Sandrart assumed in his article Neue 
Herausforderungen an das strategische und operative Denken!  Ist Clausewitz noch zeitgemäß?, in 
Schössler, Dietmar (ed.), Die Entwicklung des Strategie- und Operationsbegriffes seit Clausewitz, p. 
78). 
33 See Unterseher, Europe`s Armed Forces at the Millenium, pp. 14-24.  
10 
or German officers have been using nor an analysis of historic or current strategic 
concepts of Britain, France or Germany. By contrast, this study will reconstruct some 
main historical ideas about strategy that were created within these different countries. 
This approach is based on the assumption that ideas of outstanding theorists on strategy 
surely influenced the thoughts and deeds of people involved in strategy-making, 
sometimes without even being aware of this influence.34 Essentially, this study assumes 
that ideas are important and influential on strategic behavior.35  
Nevertheless, the focus of this study must be narrowed again. Not all theorists that 
might have influenced the discussions on military strategy in Europe can be covered here. 
A selection must be made. First of all, only those theorists widely regarded as classical 
should be treated here. Thus, theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine H. de Jomini, 
Helmuth von Moltke, J.F.C. Fuller, and Basil H. Liddell Hart remain as the main focus of 
this study. Secondly, among these, Clausewitz seems to possess the dominant position. 
This does not imply that most of the other European strategists agree with Clausewitzs 
theory of war in general or his strategic considerations, in particular.36 However, even 
more than 150 years after the first publication of On War, Clausewitzs theory anchors in 
the core of the current strategic discussion.37 Therefore, the strategic theorists selected in 
                                                 
34 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. XVII, 261; Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, pp. 231-
232. 
35 See Gray who points out the interrelationship between strategic ideas and strategic behavior (Gray, 
Modern Strategy, pp. 4, 35-36: But no matter how firmly sets of strategic ideas are anchored in the 
realities of yesterdays strategic history or in anticipated strategic realities, there is always a strategic 
theoretical dimension to the making, execution, and doing of strategy (p. 36). 
36 Ironically, in the US an American national security community exists which is significantly shaped 
by Clausewitzs theories. More information in Bassford, Christopher, Clausewitz and his works, p. 27; 
available (online): http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZSUMM/CWORKHOL.htm 
(08.01.01).  
37 See Howard, Michael, The Influence of Clausewitz, in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 27-44; 
Paret, Clausewitz and the State; the latest publication is Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999. Gray writes on 
p. XI: Whether I have been studying nuclear targeting, the leverage of seapower, or the strategic 
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this study are analyzed by using Clausewitzs theory of war as an analytical screen to 
look through.38 
The purpose of this study is to identify those issues of strategic theory, in which 
the European nations have established different traditions, and their implications for the 
EU. Different strategic theories might have been influenced by political, geopolitical, 
historical, economic, social, and even cultural differences among the European states 
that, if not reflected, could cause misperceptions in the interpretation of foreign strategic 
theorists. Again, Clausewitz, who, at the same time, was characterized as the Mahdi of 
the masses (Liddell Hart) or the proponent of limited war, appears to be an excellent 
point of reference for the test of this proposition. Thus, through the detection of national 
differences and intellectual misperceptions, this study aims to reconcile different 
approaches to the theory of strategy of European states. As a result, reconciling strategic 
theories to the greatest extent possible might help politicians, officials and officers to 
establish an improved communication and cooperation in developing common European 
military strategies. 
This study is not intended to develop the future EU Strategic Concept. However, 
it might provide useful insights in those strategic issues in the realm of thought and 
theory that are in the core of the EUs strategic concepts. Here, the European process of 
military integration and the multinationality of military formations and operations are 
                                                 
 
utility of special operations, Clausewitzs On War has been my constant companion and by far the 
most heavily used book in my library. He argues that Clausewitz should retain the title of First 
Theorist of War (p. 12). This argument is widely discussed on pp. 79-112. 
38 Furthermore, this study excludes the dimension of nuclear war and strategy including the argument 
that ... nuclear war is no longer a continuation of policy by other means (Aron, Raymond, 
Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1985, p. 317; see 
also pp. 318-345). With Britain and France, the EU may someday possess nuclear weapons on a 
strategic and sub-strategic level. Its strategic implication must be covered in an additional study. 
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selected as central issues of European strategy-making that need to be analyzed in more 
detail by using the Clausewitzian theoretical approach. 
In general, chapter II pursues the purpose of portraying Clausewitzs theory of 
war. Chapter III reveals the interpretation of Clausewitzs theoretical writings in Britain, 
France, and Germany, and shows how Clausewitz might help to overcome the diversity 
in the European strategic traditions and cultures, thereby being aware that Clausewitz 
himself has been subject to controversial disputes. This includes detecting commonalties 
and continuities in national strategic thinking, and evaluating to what extent diversity and 
national traditions can be maintained without disturbing the common European effort. 
Chapter IV aims to exemplify how Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy could help us 
to gain an improved understanding of current strategic developments in Europe.  
The main proposition of this study is that a common strategic tradition or culture, 
although limited, can be reconstructed from European history. The elaboration of future 
common European military strategies should be based on the theoretical framework 
Clausewitzs theory of war provides. The sometimes-devastating critiques of Clausewitz 
have quite often been the result of misperceptions caused by (geo-) political, cultural, and 
even ideological, prejudices. Finally, Clausewitzs theory of strategy is the most 
comprehensive theory that deals, in particular, with the most challenging strategic 




                                                 
39 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 1. See also pp. 5, 357. 
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C. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The theoretical background of this study on Clausewitz and European strategic 
cultures is derived from the discussions within the realm of international relations. In 
general, this study looks at strategic theory and its future implementation in the European 
Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) context through the screen of the neo-liberal 
approach, reinforced with some constructivist elements. This is followed mainly because 
the neo-liberal theory possesses, compared with its neo-realist competitor, a broader 
screen to look at the strategic developments in Europe.  
Clausewitz, by contrast, is definitely a representative of the realist approach. He 
puts main emphasis on the state, on balance-of-power policies, and on the dominance of 
military power.40 Politically, Clausewitz is ... a theoretician of some sort of European 
equilibrium.41 On this level he realized that, as Aron argues,  
The tendency towards equilibrium is not enough to prevent the temporary 
superiority of one state over all the others; that state ends up by perishing 
by fault of its very success, since it ranges against itself the majority of the 
other members of the European republic.42  
 
The core theoretical assumption in the neo-realist theory is that  
Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, 
requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated 
by units wishing to survive.43  
 
                                                 
40 Clausewitz, On War, p. 374; Paret, Clausewitz and the State; Paret, Peter, Moran, Daniel, Part 
Two: Introduction, in Clausewitz, Carl von: Historical and political writings, Princeton University 
Press 1992, pp. 9, 12, 229-230. Paret and Moran point out the influence of Machiavelli on Clausewitzs 
historical and political thinking. Apparently, Clausewitz based his deliberations not on the idea of 
perpetual peace and the League of Nations, as envisioned by Kant  (Kant, Immanuel, Perpetual 
peace and other essays, Cambridge/Indianapolis, p. 115). 
41 Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, p. 102. 
42 Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, p. 103. 
43 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of international Politics, New York, 1979, p. 121. 
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Herewith, Kenneth Waltz, the main protagonist of the neo-realist theory of 
international relations, argues that there is a lawful relationship between the form of the 
order (international system) and the political behavior of politicians. As long as this 
assumption is fulfilled, a specific international order (anarchy) causes  in all times and at 
all places  a specific political behavior (balance-of-power policies). Balance-of-power 
policy does not necessarily force states to maximize power. Due to the insight in the 
security dilemma44, states may limit themselves in increasing power in order to prevent 
other states from feeling threatened and stimulating them to increase power too, thus 
making the security situation of all states worse. Therefore, the first concern of states is 
not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system45.  
What are the implications of the neo-realist theory for strategy? Nations that 
follow this approach are likely to focus strategy on the promotion of their own interests in 
terms of political, economic and, in particular, military power. The state is the main actor 
that determines politics. Cooperation with other states does not have its own purpose but 
serves only to maintain the states position in the international system. Assuming politics 
is a zero-sum-game forcing nations to struggle for survival, neo-realists are more 
pessimistic on the outcome of multinational cooperation. Consequently, nations are more 
likely to defect from cooperation or to define small win-sets46, thus making cooperative 
agreements unlikely. In fact, states might be forced to defect from cooperation even if is 
beneficial for them. This happens when cooperation is perceived as to providing 
                                                 
44 Waltz, Theory of international Politics, pp. 64, 186-7. 
45 Waltz, Theory of international Politics, p. 126. 
46 Putnam, Robert D., Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, in Double-Edged Diplomacy, ed. by Peter 
B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1993, p. 439. 
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competitor nations with stronger relative gains47. Fixed to this power positioning, 
ethical and moral considerations are not supposed to have any influence on the political 
decision-making processes. To sum up, strategy seen through the screen of the neo-realist 
theory is deduced from historical continuities and the realism of pessimism.48 
Neo-liberal theorists agree on the core neo-realist assumption that the 
international system is anarchical. However, since the end of World War II, at least since 
the 70s of the 20th century, interdependence has become a further characteristic of the 
international system. Neo-liberal theorists essentially argue that interdependence enables 
states to affect each other; that, next to the nation states, trans-national and trans-
governmental organizations are involved in world politics; and that military issues have 
lost their priority in those political issues that are determined by high interdependence.49 
Therefore, states have an interest in international regimes, international institutions and 
cooperation. Using game theory50, neo-liberal theorists point out that politics is a non-
zero-sum game, providing advantages for all nations engaged in international 
cooperation. Therefore, from the neo-liberal point of view, stable cooperation is possible. 
To sum up, strategy seen through the screen of the neo-liberal theory of international 
relations emphasizes cooperation among states and between states and trans-national 
actors; and it is aware of ethics and morale in international relations and, in general, of 
the complexity of political interaction. 
                                                 
47 Grieco, Joseph M., Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal 
Institutionalism, International Organization 42, 3, Summer 1988, p. 505. 
48 Grays Modern Strategy is an example of the realist approach in strategic theory (Gray, Modern 
Strategy, pp. 10-11). 
49 Keohane, Robert, Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence, Longman 2001. 
50 Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, 1984. 
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The constructivist approach basically argues that states have problems to define 
national interests. Interests are not just out there waiting to be discovered; they are 
constructed through social interaction51. Due to the strong interdependence within a 
dense network of transnational and international social relations, states are ... socialized 
to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them 
live52. Therefore, national interests can change, for example through teaching and 
learning. Thus, states might even become motivated to follow the logic of 
appropriateness. Instead of focusing on the political, economic or military consequences 
of their decisions, states act in a specific way in order to meet moral obligations. Thomas 
Risse even argues that foreign policies of states could at times be understood as 
implementation of objectives that had been created by arguing, in a kind of ideal speech 
situation that is not constrained by any win-sets the participants are obliged to obey. 
Then,  
Interests and identities are no longer fixed, but subject to interrogation and 
challenges and, thus, to change. The goal of the discursive interaction is to 
achieve argumentative consensus with the other, not to push through ones 
own view of the world or moral values. Since the validity claims of 
identities and interests are at stake in theoretical and practical discourses, 
an argumentative consensus has constitutive effects on actors53.  
 
Consequently, even small states are able to influence the foreign policy of greater 
states if the latter are open to the arguments of the former. From this point of view, 
strategy is definitely no means to increase the power of the state or to pursue pure 
national interests.  
                                                 
51 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, p. 2. 
52 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, p. 2. 
53 Risse, Thomas: Lets argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, in: International 
Organization 54, 1, Winter 2000, p. 10. 
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To sum up, depending on the varied theoretical approaches, nation states might 
use strategy in general and military strategy in particular for different purposes: as a 
pursuit of national interests; as cooperation with benefits for all participants; as 
implementation of ethics and moral obligations; as socialization in form of teaching and 
learning; as discourse to define common policies without any regard to national interests. 
Preferences for specific theories of international relations are likely to influence military 
strategic thinking. With regard to the EU, these preferences might cause friction in the 
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II. CLAUSEWITZS THEORY OF WAR  
 
A. BIOGRAPHICAL REMARKS 
 
Clausewitzs life has been described in detail several times elsewhere.54 In this 
chapter, the short biographical remarks show that Clausewitz, although a theoretical mind 
and without major practical political and military influence in actual policy between 1816 
and 1830, possessed outstanding experience in the field of warfare on tactical and 
strategic levels. Thus, the widespread assumption is falsified that Clausewitz was too 
strong of a theoretical head to be useful for military practice, and a highly educated 
officer, who, nevertheless, remained only a writer on war or even a military 
dilettante55. Ironically, Clausewitz regarded theoretical and philosophical considerations 
as necessary to understand war because of his rich experiences in war and peace. 
Clausewitz was well experienced in warfare. He fought five campaigns in 
different theaters between Moscow and Paris. In 1793, even before he turned thirteen 
years, Clausewitz participated as an officer candidate in the campaign of the allies against 
revolutionary France where he experienced his first combat56. During this campaign, the 
young Clausewitz took part in the siege of Valmy of which Goethe later said was the 
signal of a new era of world history. After a long period of routine duty and officer 
education, Clausewitz, being the adjutant of Prince August of Prussia, experienced the 
                                                 
54 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 25172; Schössler, Carl von Clausewitz, Hamburg, 1991; 
Parkinson, Roger, Clausewitz, New York: Stein and Day, 1979; Bassford, Clausewitz and his works, p. 
3-6; Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, pp. 11-40; Uwe Hartmann, Carl von Clausewitz, 
Erkenntnis, Bildung, Generalstabsausbildung, München: Olzog Verlag, 1998, pp. 14-41. 
55 Bassford, Clausewitz and his works, p. 3.  
56 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 29. 
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decisive, even humiliating defeat of the Prussian army against Napoleon in the battles at 
Jena and Auerstedt (1806). In the Princes battalion, Clausewitz conducted a long-lasting 
retreat against overwhelming French forces until surrender was inevitable. In 1812, 
disappointed about the decision of the Prussian king to support Napoleons invasion of 
Russia with a Prussian Expeditionary Corps, Clausewitz resigned from Prussian service 
to become a Russian officer. Although handicapped because of his ignorance of the 
Russian language, Clausewitz participated in the strategic decision-making process on 
how to encounter the French offensive. This included the main question of whether the 
defense should be conducted as far west as possible or after the French Grand Army 
attack had reached its point of culmination.57 Then, between 1813 and 1815, Clausewitz 
served as a general staff officer on corps level, initially in the Russian-German legion, 
later as chief of staff in the III. Prussian Corps. At Ligny in 1815, his corps achieved the 
operational preconditions for the decisive attack against Napoleon at Waterloo.  
After a long period of nearly fifteen years at the War Academy, Clausewitz was 
given command of artillery brigades stationed in East Prussia. When revolutions in 
France and Poland signaled danger of a new war in Europe, Clausewitz again became 
chief of staff, which, this time, was for a military formation to observe the border with 
Poland.58 However, Clausewitzs burning desire to become assigned as a commander of a 
major military formation remained unfulfilled. 
                                                 
57 Clausewitz, Carl von, The campaign of 1812 in Russia, in Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and 
political writings, Princeton University Press 1992, pp. 110-204. 
58 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 396-430. 
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Clausewitz dealt with the consequences of revolutions: the French Revolution and 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)59. The RMA that Clausewitz experienced 
originated from the French Revolution of 1789. The political and social results of the 
French Revolution meshed with changes in military institutions, tactics, equipment and 
training previously applicable or under development.60  
Only a few years later, the centralized French states capacity to extract taxes and 
to conscript motivated citizens61, the application of the tiralleur tactics as an easy and 
rapid method for training large numbers of infantry soldiers, the introduction of 
requisition as a logistical principle, and the enhanced mobility of the artillery enabled 
Napoleon to develop and implement military strategies that were completely different 
from the cabinet wars of the old system: Napoleon made war more offensive, more 
aggressive, and more costly. Aiming to achieve significant political results, the French 
emperor sought decisively to defeat the enemys armies as a prerequisite for immediate 
political negotiations. As Paret summarizes, 
                                                 
59 RMA can be defined as follows: An RMA ...occurs when application of new technologies into a 
significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and 
organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict. It 
does so by producing a dramatic increase  often an order of magnitude or greater  in the combat 
potential and military effectiveness of armed forces (Krepinevich, Andrew F., Cavalry to Computer: 
The Pattern of Military Revolutions, in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (eds.), Strategy and 
Force Planning, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, p. 430). In On War, Clausewitz points 
out that the contemporary RMA was not caused by new technologies. Clearly the tremendous effects 
of the French Revolution abroad were caused not so much by new military methods and concepts as by 
radical changes in policies and administration, by the new character of government, altered conditions 
of the French people, and the like (Clausewitz, On War, p. 609). 
60 Taking part in the revolutionary wars, Clausewitz realized the difference between his military 
training and the reality of war (Clausewitz, Carl von, From Observations on Prussia in Her Great 
Catastrophe, in Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, pp. 40-41). 
61 See Tilly, Charles, State and Counterrevolution in France, Social Research 65, N. 1 (Spring 
1989), pp. 71-97. 
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The new political aim  conquest and the destruction of old political 
entities  brought with it a new strategic and tactical mission: the 
destruction of the enemys military power.62 
Clausewitz experienced this revolution in warfare from its early beginnings in 
1792 to its highly developed forms in 1813  1815. He, therefore, realized that strategy- 
making is a process that is influenced by several dimensions, for example policies, 
politics, social conditions, economy, technology, and organization. Most importantly, 
Clausewitz recognized the difficulties of states and military forces taking notice and 
adjusting themselves to revolutionary changes in opposing states.63   
Clausewitz served in multinational environments. As mentioned above, 
Clausewitz cooperated with Russian officers during the 1812 campaign and as a general 
staff officer in the multinational military corps, the German-Russian Legion64, 
established in 1813.65 As a result, Clausewitz became a close witness of coalition warfare 
and strategy-making.66  
Clausewitz gathered wide experience in the field of policies and politics. During 
the reform of the Prussian state and military (1807-1819), Clausewitz, as the personal 
assistant of General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, became highly involved in policies and 
                                                 
62 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 32. See also Paret, Peter, Napoleon and the Revolution in War, 
in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, 
1986, pp. 129-130. Napoleon did not invent all these characteristics himself, but he was brilliant in 
combining all the innovations of different people in a cohesive conduct of warfare. See Paret, Peter, 
Introduction, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 7; Paret, Napoleon and the 
Revolution in War, p. 127; Palmer, R.R., Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to 
National War, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 94, 105-119. 
63 Clausewitz, Carl von, Historische Briefe über die großen Kriegserlebnisse im Oktober 1806, neu 
herausgegeben und kommentiert von Joachim Niemeyer, Bonn: Ferd. Dümmler Verlag, 1977. 
64 See Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 226-227, 241-243. 
65 At this time, it was not unusual for officers to serve for foreign countries. However, Clausewitzs 
resignation occurred not without conflicts. See Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 220-221. 
66 Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, pp. 102-105; Rothfels, Hans, Carl von Clausewitz. Politik 
und Krieg, Eine ideengeschichtliche Studie, Berlin 1920, pp. 198-200, 202-203. 
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politics.67 Scharnhorst was responsible for the transformation of the Prussian military 
forces that had to be compatible with the reform of the state as a whole. In 1807, the 
Prussian king, Frederick William IV. established the Military Reorganization 
Commission (Militär-Reorganisations-Kommission; MRK) and ordered the 
Commission to create the foundations of a new state. The head of the Commission was a 
civilian, the Staatsminister Freiherr vom und zum Stein, with several high-ranking 
officers, among them Scharnhorst, as the members of the Commission. One main goal of 
the Commissions work was unifying the nation and the army, thus provoking the 
awakening of the nation as a prerequisite for liberty and liberation. Out of this political 
goal, the social function of the new army was deduced that it would be the school of a 
new nation and that the military reforms would be completed by comprehensive political 
reform.68  
When those with traditional political views were excluded, all members of the 
Commission agreed with what Stein assumed was the fundamental prerequisite for the 
success of the reform: We shall wait in vain for the awakening in our country of that 
public spirit which the English and the French and other peoples possess, if we do not 
imitate them in setting for our military leaders certain bounds and limitations which they 
must not disregard.69  
                                                 
67 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 137-146; Hahlweg, Werner, Das Clausewitz-Bild einst und 
jetzt, in: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Berlin, 19/201991, pp. 26-34; Hartmann, Carl von 
Clausewitz, Erkenntnis, Bildung, Generalstabsausbildung, pp. 26-30; Paret/ Moran, Part Two: 
Introduction, p. 6. 
68 Detailed information in Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, 
London/Oxford/New York, 1955/64, pp. 37-53; see also Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 137-46. 
69 Stein, quoted in Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, p. XIII. Clausewitzs 
relationship to the state is deeply elaborated by Paret, Clausewitz. Essentially, Paret argues that ... we 
cannot understand the achievements and problems of his career and his private life unless we recognize 
that for him ... the state and its basis, the political vigor of society, occupied places very near the center 
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The MRK was an outstanding example of civil-military cooperation during a 
period of comprehensive state making activities. The involvement of officers in this 
process created a new understanding of their professionalism by cooperating with 
politicians, and reflecting upon the socio-political preconditions and effects of military 
reorganizations, thereby accepting the supremacy of policies and politics.  
Later, at the end of 1812 when Clausewitz had already been a Russian officer, he 
contributed decisively to the making of the agreement between General York von 
Wartenburg, the leader of the Prussian auxiliary corps attached to the Grand Army of 
Napoleon, and the Russian General Diebitsch. That agreement, called Tauroggen-
Convention after its location, accelerated not only the destruction of Napoleons Grand 
Army, but also facilitated the creation of new alliances in Europe that finally led to its 
liberation from French occupation.70 Around 1818, Clausewitz even applied for the 
assignment of Prussian attaché in London that finally was refused. 71 
Clausewitz practiced advance educational methods. He participated in 
progressive officer education courses conducted by Scharnhorst and, later, worked as a 
teacher in military subjects, such as tactics and strategy. Early in the 1790s, Scharnhorst 
recognized the first signs of the ongoing RMA in France. He  
... called attention to the significance of her coherent, aggressive strategy, 
which served interests that could be expressed in national rather than 
dynastic terms, the rapidity with which troops now moved, the willingness 
                                                 
 
of his thought (Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 6). 
70 Clausewitz was well aware of the likely consequences of this agreement for the politics of Prussia 
and, definitely, for the Prussian general York. See Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, pp. 
194-200; see also Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 229-232. 
71 Paret, Peter, Bemerkungen zu dem Versuch von Clausewitz, zum Gesandten in London ernannt zu 
werden, in Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands, Bd. 26, 1977, pp. 161-172. 
25 
to accept huge casualties, and the freedom and enthusiasm of the 
individual soldier.72  
 
When Gerhard von Scharnhorst73 entered Prussian service, he became the director 
of an educational course for officer candidates74. Clausewitz attended the first course and 
finished as Scharnhorsts best disciple. Therefore, Clausewitz was selected not only to 
instruct officers at the Kriegsakademie75 founded as part of the military reform in 1810 
but also to educate the crown prince76 in military affairs. The task to educate the strategic 
mind of the future king was definitely of utmost strategic importance.  
Finally, Clausewitz gathered experiences in the field of civil-military relations. 
During his assignment as Scharnhorsts assistant, Clausewitz was responsible for public 
relation activities of the reform party.77 Furthermore, Clausewitz became heavily 
involved in the planning of supplementary military formations, called the Landwehr and 
the Landsturm.78 Finally, these plans were used in 1813 when the Prussian king 
Frederick William III. addressed his people to insurrect against Napoleon. Prior to the 
war of liberation, however, Clausewitz disputed with others in the political-military 
                                                 
72 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 32. The educational relationship between Scharnhorst and 
Clausewitz is analyzed in Hartmann, Clausewitz. Erkenntnis, Bildung, Generalstabsausbildung, pp. 
25-32. See also Clausewitzs description of Scharnhorst as a teacher in On the Life and Character of 
Scharnhorst, in Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, pp. 85-109. 
73 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 56-77; White, Charles E., The Enlightened Soldier, 1989. 
74 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 97. 
75 See Rosen, Claus von,  Carl von Clausewitz, in Detlef Bald, Uwe Hartmann, Claus von Rosen 
(eds.), Klassiker der Pädagogik im deutschen Militär, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1999, pp. 86-102. 
76 See Clausewitzs letter to the crown prince, dated 29th March 1812, just before Clausewitz left 
Prussia, in Clausewitz, Carl von, Verstreute kleine Schriften, edited by Werner Hahlweg, Osnabrück 
1979, pp. 169-171. 
77 As early as 1808, Clausewitz wrote newspaper articles about the reform of the Prussian state. Later, 
asked by Gneisenau, Clausewitz wrote an account of the 1813 campaign that aimed to ... justify the 
conduct of the war to the public and raise enthusiasm for the fighting ahead (Paret, Clausewitz and the 
State, p. 240). From the beginning of the reform period, Clausewitz started to address the people in 
order to win their support for the political goals of the reform party. 
78 After 1815, Clausewitz continued to fight against the opponents of the Landwehr as an institution 
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administration about the opportune time to initiate the peoples insurrection.79 Realizing 
that Frederick William III. was likely to act very cautiously, Clausewitz left Prussian 
service and joined the Russian army, thus disobeying the kings orders. Disputing with 
the king, Clausewitz experienced the limits of loyalty and the strong feelings of 
individual responsibility and conscientious decisions. In his famous Political 
Declaration, addressed to Frederick William III, Clausewitz definitely intended to 
expose the king, and to motivate the Prussian people80:  
As devoted as we are to the government, we cannot deny that in the main 
it is lack of confidence in the government that causes general 
discouragement. Equally, the government has little confidence in its 
subjects and even in itself. Its total lack of faith in itself and others is the 
general cause of our public opinion; and the constant influence of 
weaklings, profligates, and shirkers on this opinion is the cause of the 
public mood. I formally renounce this opinion and mood.... I renounce the 
facile hope of being saved by chance. (...) I believe and confess that a 
people can value nothing more highly than the dignity and liberty of its 
existence. That it must defend these to the last drop of its blood. That there 
is no higher duty to fulfill, no higher law to obey.81  
 
Clausewitzs diversity of military assignments and richness of expertise in 
policies, politics, strategy, and tactics appears to be an idealtypus of the military walk of 
life. Nevertheless, to understand Clausewitz, it is not only important to get an impression 
of his background but also to recognize his approach in dealing with experience. 
Experience is important; however, it is more important to reflect upon it. Clausewitz 
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intensively thought experience through, and used experience to educate himself. Very 
early, he practiced education as a unity of philosophy and experience, as a reflection upon 
political and military experience with the aim of learning about war and strategy. 
Consequently, Clausewitzs theories of war and strategy derive from experience and 
reflection  upon five wars, upon reform politics, upon revolutionary strategies and 
tactics, upon multinationality, and upon civil-military relations.  
However, Clausewitz assumed his personal background as not sufficient to meet 
the requirements of science and truth. Therefore, Clausewitz dove deeply into military 
history in order to investigate the overall nature of war independently from the current 
understanding of war and his own experiences. In the end, he did historical research on 
more than 140 military campaigns, comprising, for example, the operations of King 
Adolphus in the 30-year-war, the operations of Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. 
To sum up, Clausewitz definitely was a highly experienced officer who actually 
became occupied with outstanding challenges. For the purpose of this research, it is most 
important to highlight that Clausewitz elaborated his theory of war and strategy within an 
environment characterized by new threats, revolutionary changes in warfare, and the 
growing importance of domestic politics in determining strategy. Bassfords assessment 
is entirely correct when he writes, Clausewitz was much more than a strategist: he was a 






B. OUTLINE OF CLAUSEWITZS THEORETICAL WORKS 
 
In his theoretical works, Clausewitz covers a wide range of issues that are related 
to military affairs. Clearly, his main occupation is the history of warfare; however, 
history of warfare  beneath his personal experience in war - remains only a source to 
reflect upon with the ultimate aim of writing a comprehensive theory of war. The result 
of Clausewitzs deliberations on the theory of war is his opus magna, On War. Reflecting 
upon history and his own experiences in the political and military realms, Clausewitz 
recognizes the widespread links of war with other areas of social life, in particular with 
policies and politics83. Applying his theory to the practice of war, Clausewitz wrote 
several security studies and did intensive research, ranging from the character of nations 
to questions of military organization.84 Furthermore, Clausewitz published articles to 
support the position of the reformer struggling with traditionalists over the reform of the 
Prussian state85, and wrote papers as didactical means to facilitate the (self-) education of 
(future) officers86. Last but not least, Clausewitz wrote several short articles on what 
today is called humanities, covering philosophy, art, literature87, and several hundreds of 
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letters, partly business letters but most often letters to his wife88, in which he expressed 
personal judgments not only on his own life but also on the current political situation in 
Europe.  
Criticizing Heinrich von Bülow's definition of strategy89 in his first theoretical 
paper, written in 1804, Clausewitz laid the decisive cornerstone for his further 
deliberations on war.90 While Bülow defined strategy as ... all military movements out 
of the enemys cannon range or range of vision91, Clausewitz highlighted the 
importance of the purpose for military strategic thinking and planning when he wrote: ... 
strategy forms the theory of using battles for the purposes of the war92. The main reason 
to combine strategy and purpose tightly was that the theory of war would otherwise be in 
contradiction to the reality of war. By introducing the political purpose into the theory of 
war, Clausewitz detects the key element to explain continuities as well as diversities of 
war and strategy. Emphasizing the fundamental interrelationship between (political) 
purpose and strategy, Clausewitz liberates strategic thinking from the geographical, one-
dimensional calculations some strategists had proposed as the proper way to solve 
strategic problems; thereby, the Prussian philosopher of war gives war a meaning, and 
places war as a social phenomenon within the multidimensional field of policies and 
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politics. In the end, Clausewitz opened a wide array of issues necessary to consider when 
dealing with strategy.  
In the following subchapter93, some main propositions of Clausewitzs theory of 
war and strategy are discussed. Prior to this, some remarks on the latters philosophy of 
science are necessary in order to facilitate understanding. However, even though 
propositions are separated here for analytical reasons, they must not be seen as isolated 
but integrated in a comprehensive theoretical approach.  
 
1. Philosophy and Experience 
 
The main characteristic of Clausewitzs theory of war is the astonishingly high 
amount of philosophical-theoretical reflection upon war as an observable phenomenon. 
As Clausewitz argues in the authors preface of On War,  
 
Analysis and observation, theory and experience must never disdain or 
exclude each other; on the contrary, they support each other. The 
propositions of this book therefore, like short spans of an arch, base their 
axioms on the secure foundation either of experience or the nature of war 
as such, and are thus adequately buttressed.94  
 
Consequently, on the one side, observable phenomena of war must be related to 
theoretical considerations; on the other side, logical conclusions must be tested against 
the reality. Being aware of the tendency in German philosophy to reflect upon social 
                                                 
93 This research paper does not reflect the development of Clausewitzs works. Instead, it refers to the 
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affairs in a pure rationalist way that disregards the empirical reality, Clausewitz states 
that On War is an  
... attempt to investigate the essence of the phenomena of war and to 
indicate the links between these phenomena and the nature of their 
component parts. No logical conclusion has been avoided; but whenever 
the thread became too thin I have preferred to break it off and go back to 
the relevant phenomena of experience. Just as some plants bear fruit only 
if they dont shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves and 
flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil 
- experience.95  
 
Because of this interaction between idealism and realism, Clausewitz often 
conducts philosophical-logical considerations that he, some pages later, confronts against 
the reality of war in order to gain theoretical insights in war and warfare. Consequently, 
Clausewitzs theory of war contains two different concepts: absolute war as a 
philosophical concept (based on logical thinking), and real war as an empirical concept 
(based on history and experience). Whenever Clausewitz talks about war, the reader must 
ask himself what kind of war Clausewitz reflects upon.96 
However, Clausewitz does not apply the dialectical modes of argumentation that 
oscillates between the concepts of absolute and real war in order to confuse the reader. 
By contrast, Clausewitzs aim is to achieve analytical insights. Similar to the Idealtypus-
concept developed by the German sociologist Max Weber nearly 100 years later97, 
Clausewitz gains important insights in explaining why war in reality is different from its 
logical construction. For example, when he asked why war had not developed his 
absolute form as theory suggests when two independent forces attempt to impose their 
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will on each other, Clausewitz discovered several characteristics of war: that war is never 
an isolated act; that war does not consist of a single short blow; that in war the result is 
never final.98 Thus, in the end, Clausewitz discovers the influence of politics and policies 
on war and strategy. 
To proof philosophical-logical deliberations or any proposition induced by 
personal experience, Clausewitz assesses history as the most proper testing ground, 
resulting in history being more than the mere reconstruction of what had happened. For 
the theory of war, history must become truly critical history that, especially, detects 
cause-effect relations, and evaluates the military means employed to achieve specific 
goals. Clausewitz argues,  
We distinguish between the critical approach and the plain narrative of a 
historical event, which merely arranges facts one after another, and at 
most touches on their immediate causal links. Three different intellectual 
activities may be contained in the critical approach.  First, the discovery 
and interpretation of equivocal facts. This is historical research proper, and 
has nothing in common with theory. Second, the tracing of effects back to 
their causes. This is critical analysis proper. It is essential for theory; for 
whatever in theory is to be defined, supported, or simply described by 
reference to experience can only be dealt with in this manner. Third, the 
investigation and evaluation of means employed. This last is criticism 
proper, involving praise and censure. Here theory serves history, or rather 
the lessons to be drawn from history. In the last two activities which are 
the truly critical parts of historical inquiry, it is vital to analyze everything 
down to its basic elements, to inconvertible truth. One must not stop half-
way, as is so often done, at some arbitrary assumption or hypothesis.99 
 
In Clausewitzs view, cause-effect relations and the evaluation of military action 
cannot be deduced from absolute principles of war and warfare. By contrast, Clausewitz 
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connects the critical approach with the hermeneutical concept of historism. As Bassdorf 
reveals,  
Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, rejecting absolute categories, 
standards, and values. The past has to be accepted on its own terms. The 
historian must attempt to enter into the mindsets and attitudes of any given 
period, the spirit of the age.100  
 
Seen through the screen of historicism, war and strategy vary depending on the 
changing nature of their political, social, economical, technological, and ideological 
environment. Criticizing those strategic theorists who intend to construct a positive 
system of war and strategy containing absolute principles beyond historical variance, 
Clausewitz claimed that ... we must face the fact that war and its forms result from ideas, 
emotions, and conditions prevailing at the time  and to be quite honest we must admit 
that this was the case even when war assumed its absolute state under Bonaparte.101 
Ideas, emotions, and conditions prevailing at the time implies that the ... same political 
object can elicit differing reactions from different peoples, and even from the same 
people at different times.102 Consequently, the understanding of war  as a historic event 
or in his current or future appearance  requires the reference to the spirit of the age. 
Nevertheless, beneath the uniqueness of historical situations, Clausewitz strived to reveal 
continuities in history to the greatest extent possible. This prevented him from over-
emphasizing revolutions in the political or military realms. 
However, it is not only the relativity of history that causes contradictions between 
general principles of war and the reality of war. Worse (from the viewpoint of the 
theorists who intend to create parsimonious theories), any given situation (in war; U.H.) 
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requires that probabilities be calculated in the light of circumstances...103. In addition, by 
far the worst from a rational point of view, war and warfare are extremely characterized 
by chance: No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with 
chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part 
in war.104 
Finally, as a concluding insight from his deliberations on philosophy of science, 
Clausewitz realizes that the development of a scientific theory of war and strategy cannot 
follow the example of the very successful natural sciences. Instead, war appears to be 
rather an art. However, war is characterized by an important difference; warfare is not an 
action against an inanimate matter. By contrast, war is a social interaction, a 
communication between intelligent adversaries, within an environment that causes 
danger, physical exhaustion, lack of information, and friction.105 Assessing war as the 
continuation of discourse with the addition of other means in a resisting element, 
Clausewitz concludes that military leadership is less characterized by knowledge and 
more founded on character, talent, and even genius. Military leadership requires (a) 
sensitive and discriminating judgment (....); (and) a skilled intelligence to scent out the 
truth.106 Finally, intellectual activity in war ... leaves the field of exact sciences of logic 
and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term  the faculty 
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of using judgment to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array of 
facts and situations.107  
In general, Clausewitz does not see the possibility of developing a theory of war 
that allows the prescription of military action. As Paret and Moran argues, The purpose 
of his theoretical writings was not to teach a specific doctrine that would lead to 
successful strategies and increase operational effectiveness, but rather to contribute to an 
understanding of war as an apparently permanent element of human experience.108 
These (self-) limitations of theory were the logical conclusion of Clausewitzs reflection 
upon the nature of war: 
Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the 
material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good 
order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more 
accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the 
battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young mans 
intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the 
rest of his life.109 
   
In the end, when Clausewitz uses the word philosophy, he demands the creation 
of a new model of science110 that is more proper to the nature of war than the natural or 
positivist sciences. Finally, Clausewitz develops the prototype of the German concept of 
humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) that, nearly 100 years later, found scientific 
reputation with Wilhelm Diltheys works about hermeneutics.111 This is beyond purely 
academic interest. By contrast, Clausewitz offers hermeneutics as intellectual tools to 
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assess war and develop strategies  not only in the classrooms of war academies but also 
in exercises and real war. Furthermore, lacking any opportunity to rely on scientific 
military principles, commanders are not justified to act autonomously. Instead, thinking 
in terms of Geisteswissenschaften, commanders are set free to realize that war is a 




2. Major Propositions  
 
 
By confronting philosophical-logical deliberations with historical-empirical 
experience, Clausewitz gains outstanding insights into the nature of war and strategy. In 
the following, these insights are presented by separating them into different propositions. 
Again, one should be aware that these propositions are only separated for analytical 
reasons. 
 
Proposition 1: War is an act of force that aims for peace 
 
Essentially, war is the use of force in order to achieve goals the opponent intends 
to prevent. Clausewitz uses the analogy of a duel to illustrate this forceful relationship:  
War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up 
war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imaging a pair of 
wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his 
will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him 
incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will.113 
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By using the analogy of a duel, Clausewitz does not intend to emphasize that war 
is mainly characterized by the deployment of large military forces. Certainly, this would 
have been trivial. By contrast, the emphasis is put on the existence of an independent will 
on both sides of the warring fractions, and on their willingness to use force in order to 
achieve specific goals. Consequently, Clausewitz considers the definition of purposes and 
the willingness to use force to achieve these purposes as the decisive elements of war and 
strategy. This includes recognizing that the enemy, too, not only has preferences and 
choices but also restraints, and that the enemy is an intelligent adversary. 
War as an act of violence can only be understood comprehensively with regard to 
the final objective of war, that is peace. Therefore, strategy makers must always keep the 
intended peace in mind. This principle of thinking is justified for two reasons. First, 
strategy making in accordance with the methods of hermeneutics and dialectics requires 
an holistic intellectual approach that must have already finished its reflection upon the 
final action (here: peace) before the first step (here: war) is done.114 Second, the influence 
of the objective of peace on strategy-making is the logical consequence of the wars ... 
immediate aim ... to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further 
resistance. Consequently, strategy-making must consider a future peace order that the 
adversary finds tolerable. 
 
Proposition 2: War is a paradoxical trinity  
Realizing that there are neither absolute principles nor single social players that 
determine the phenomenon of war, Clausewitz defines war as a chameleon that lives in 
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an environment best characterized as a paradoxical trinity. Why and how war is started, 
conducted and ended, is predominately the result of three variables that function like 
magnets, determining the movement of the iron object that is in between, in this case, 
the war. These magnets are (1) the blind natural force of violence, hatred, and enmity; 
(2) the creative spirit taking advantage of the play of chance and probability, and (3) the 
rationality that makes war a subordinated instrument of policy. In Clausewitzs words, 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to 
the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always 
make war a paradoxical trinity  composed of primordial violence, hatred, 
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play 
of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free of roam; 
and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone.  
 
Based on the fundamental insight that war is a social intercourse, these magnets 
are real social players, comprising mainly of (1) the people; (2) the commander and his 
military forces; and (3) the government. As Clausewitz puts it, 
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the 
commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are 
to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope 
which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability 
and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the 
army; but the political aims are the business of government alone. 
 
Any theory of war that aims to refuse any contradiction with reality needs to 
integrate these social players:  
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in 
their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory 
that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship 
between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this 
reason alone it would be totally useless. Our task therefore is to develop a 
theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an 
object suspended between three magnets.115 
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However, the magnets might not have the same power to influence their 
common object. In determining the actual appearance of war, the government might 
gain more influence than the people or the commander. On the other side, the strength 
of each of the social players is subject to change, even during war. Consequently, the 
variables that determine war are bound in a complex interrelationship. Furthermore, to 
make it even more complex, war can  in form of feedback  change the power 
relationship between the three dominant social actors. Strategy-making as an 
institutional process has to meet the requirements of this complexity.  
 
Proposition 3: War is the continuation of policies and politics  
Testing his idealtyp considerations about absolute war against the reality of war, and realizing war does not 
necessarily escalate to its absolute form but, instead, often remains rather limited, Clausewitz recognized the permanent 
dependence of war on policies and politics. As Aron argues, It is not the initial conception of absolute war which 
allows the historical diversity of wars to be subsumed under a single concept, but the intrinsically political nature of 
war.116  
Consequently, the Prussian war philosopher argues against those who claim that 
war suspends the intercourse between governments and peoples and ... replaces it by a 
wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. He writes,  
... war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of 
other means. We deliberately use the phrase with the addition of other 
means because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not 
suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. 
In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it 
employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to 
which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the 
war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? Do political 
relations between peoples and between their governments stop when 
diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another 
expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its 
grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.117  
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In the German original, Clausewitz uses the term Politik. At first, Politik 
means the policy of the states government. However, Politik also comprises the entire 
interplay of the social actors as well as the character and the institutions of the state 
involved:  
First, ... it is clear that war should never be thought of as something 
autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire 
history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to 
penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will 
show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the 
situations which give rise to them.118  
 
Clausewitz highlights these complex policies and politics-dimensions of strategy-
making when he writes, 
Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and 
become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical 
affair but a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplies 
the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead. From the 
enemys character, from his institutions, the state of his affairs and his 
general situation, each side, using the laws of probability, forms an 
estimate of its opponents likely course and acts accordingly.119 
 
Bassford is precise when he argues that, War is an expression of both policy and 
politics, but politics is the interplay of conflicting forces (inside the state; U.H.), not the 
execution of one-sided policy initiatives.120 Consequently, all social actors of state and 
society (or more correctly, the assessment of the social actors by and on both sides of the 
war and, actually, of the neutral states121) influence the conduct of war. Even if the 
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military commander tries to prevent any outside influence on the military planning and 
decision-making process, this attempt definitely serves as evidence for the truth of 
Clausewitzs proposition: that war (and preparation of war) is always an interplay of 
social actors. Finally, Clausewitz concludes, He who maintains, as is so often the case, 
that politics should not interfere with the conduct of a war has not grasped the ABCs of 
grand strategy.122 
Policies and politics as the interplay between different states and different social actors within the states 
determine the political objectives of war. Consequently, this has a decisive impact on the definition of the military 
goals. Clausewitz displays the relationship between political objectives and military aims as follows:  
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, ... the more closely 
will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the 
more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, 
the less intense the motives, the less will the military elements natural 
tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war 
will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be 
more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will 
seem increasingly political in character123. 
 
Apparently, the motives for war are created in the intercourse between the states 
and the social players within the states. If social players commonly perceive political 
objectives as a justification for the highest possible military effort, war increasingly 
develops towards the philosophical construct of absolute war. By contrast, less 
motivation for war makes war appear more political. In the end, this might lead to the 
extreme that political objectives contradict with even the smallest military goals because 
the pursuit of military goals includes the nature of war: violence.  
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Out of the fundamental insight in war as continuation of politics and policies, 
Clausewitz draws the conclusion that politicians should have primacy over the military - 
before, during, and after the war. Consequently, within the fascinating trinity, the 
commander should be institutionally subordinated to the political leader. Additionally, 
political supremacy is justified by peace as the ultimate end of war and by the high 
complexity of war that certainly would overwhelm the intellectual and moral capabilities 
of military commanders. Consequently, the complexity of war demands the intensive 
cooperation of all state agencies involved in strategy making.124 Within this cooperative 
interrelationship, the commander is responsible for providing military expertise, and, if 
necessary, to defy and even to resist politicians if they pursue political objectives that the 
military means are not capable of achieving.125 Thus, Clausewitz defies any separation of 
the military from the political implications of a strategic plan. In practice, the grammar 
of war and strategy shows policy what is, and what is not, possible.126  
Demanding the supremacy of politicians and the cooperation of state agencies, 
Clausewitz does not advocate for a democratic and constitutional government as long as 
the state operates ... according to rational principles of efficiency and accountability127. 
However, as a reformer, Clausewitz recognized the advantages of democracies in 
ensuring the supremacy of politicians and in improving the cooperation between state 
agencies in the strategy-making process. 
 
 
                                                 
124 Clausewitz argues ... that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter 
for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon 
soldiers ... and ask them for purely military advice (Clausewitz, On War, p. 607). 
125 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 44. 
126 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 30; Clausewitz, On War, p. 605. 
127 Paret/Moran, Part Two: Introduction, p. 231. 
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Proposition 4: War varies between rather limited or rather unlimited forms  
 
In theory, war has a tendency to escalate, to rise to the extreme. Escalation is 
mainly caused by the interaction between the opposing forces. In war as an act of force, 
each side ... compels its opponents to follow suit....128 This is because each side is 
concerned that the opponent might be able to overthrow him, and each side attempts to 
evaluate the enemys power of resistance in order to assess its necessary own efforts. 
Logically, these interactions must cause the maximum exertion of strength. 
Consequently, with regard to strategy, absolute war demands 
The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a 
condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. (...) The country must 
be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces.129  
 
Clausewitz, as a witness of Napoleons warfare, saw real war heading towards the 
theoretical-logical absolute form130. However, as he learned from history, war often 
occurred in rather limited forms, depending on the power relations in the international 
system and the predominant policies and politics of the war fighting states. In these 
limited wars, opponents do not attempt to achieve decisive results; instead, they pursue 
only limited military aims, e.g. the seizure of enemy territory for bargaining purposes.131 
Sometimes, as Clausewitz realized, the causes of war are extremely limited in their 
scope: 
 most former wars were waged largely in a state of equilibrium, or at 
least expressed tensions that were so limited, so infrequent, and feeble, 
                                                 
128 Clausewitz, On War, p. 77. 
129 Clausewitz, On War, p. 90. 
130 Clausewitz is not consistent in his terminology in this case. Absolute war as a consequence of 
logical considerations definitely cannot occur in reality. Real war is always constrained. However, 
Clausewitz sometimes describes Napoleons way of warfare characterized by the striving for decisive 
results as absolute war. The reason for this might have been the impressive mobilization of national 
resources that intends to raise the efforts to the greatest extent possible. 
131 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 601-602 
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that the fighting that did occur during these periods was seldom followed 
by important results. Instead a battle might be fought to celebrate the 
birthday of a monarch (Hochkirch), to satisfy military honor (Kunersdorf), 
or to assuage a commanders vanity (Freiberg). In our opinion it is 
essential that a commander should recognize these circumstances and act 
in concert with their spirit. 132 
 
Consequently,   
... the war leader must ... ask which victory he needs in order to attain his 
political ends. In the abstract, the alternative of victory by knockout or 
victory on points asserts itself; in reality, it only indicates two extreme 
points between which are inserted many intermediates.133 
 
However, war itself might change the political purposes that once limited it.134 
All social actors of the fascinating trinity, when facing war, might change their initial 
positions, thus having an increasing or decreasing impact on political objectives and 
military aims and, consequently, on the means made available to achieve them. 
Clausewitz emphasizes that this process is not necessarily a rational undertaking. War is 
open to irrationality, to violent emotions. Sometimes, even for the government as a 
rational actor, it might be rational to surrender to the emotions of the people.  
With regard to strategy-making, politicians and commanders must take the 
permanent possibility of escalation (and de-escalation) into account.  
 
Proposition 5: Strategy is the use of battle for the purpose of war 
 
In this proposition, Clausewitz highlights the meaning of the political purpose of 
war. Basically, military strategic planning starts with a political purpose given by 
politicians that military commanders have to transform into military aims. Consequently, 
                                                 
132 Clausewitz, On War, p. 222.  
133 Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, p. 83. See also Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, p. 44.  
134 Clausewitz, On War, p. 92: ... the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of 
the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable 
consequences. 
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strategic planning is harmed ... if policy is vague, if its objectives are ephemeral, or if it 
sets political constraints upon military activity that prevent generation of sufficient 
strategic effect to produce success.135  
Strategic effect depends on success in the field of operations136 and tactics. 
Consequently, Clausewitz argues that, to achieve the military aim, not only the planning 
of battles but also the capability to fight them is the centerpiece. Ironically, this does not 
necessarily imply bloody clashes. As Bassford argues,  
Clausewitz likened actual bloodshed to the occasional cash transaction in a 
business normally operating on credit. He did not say that a bloodless war 
of maneuver (a la Sun Tzu or Maurice de Saxe) is impossible, merely that 
maneuver by itself is meaningless. It must be backed up with the credible 
threat of battlefield success.137 
 
Even if a mere demonstration of force is the military aim, this strategy is probably 
only successful if the adversary perceives the deployed forces as capable of conducting 
battles.  
Furthermore, Clausewitz clarifies that military strategy is the level of planning 
between the political level and the tactical level. Consequently, strategy is an balancer 
between political ends and tactical means. If the strategic planning is faulty, even a 
substantial sequence of tactical victories may not be sufficient to achieve the political 
objectives. On the other hand, even the best strategy cannot reach its goals if no tactical 
victories are achieved.  
 
 
Proposition 6: War can have multiple ends but only a single means 
 
                                                 
135 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 44. 
136 Clausewitz himself did not use the term operation. 
137 Bassford, Clausewitz and his works, p. 29. 
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In theory as well as in reality, peace is the ultimate end of war. However, to re-
establish peace does not necessarily imply the disarming of the enemy. By contrast, 
Clausewitz realizes that this purpose  
... is in fact not always encountered in reality, and need not be fully 
achieved as a condition of peace. On no account should theory raise it to 
the level of a law. Many treaties have been concluded before one of the 
antagonists could be called powerless  even before the balance of power 
had been seriously altered. What is more, a review of actual cases shows a 
whole category of wars in which the very idea of defeating the enemy is 
unreal: those in which the enemy is substantially the stronger power.138 
 
In reality, several ends of war can be detected that are well below the level of 
defeating the enemy. Clausewitz gives  besides the conclusion that defeating an enemy 
is generally not sound for the party that is substantially inferior - two reasons for this 
limitation in the wars ends: first, the probability of defeat may convince one party to end 
the war; and secondly, the costs of success might appear unacceptable for the other 
party.139 
The probability of defeat as a goal-reducing factor is, in particular, true when the 
motives of war are slight. Then, ... we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of 
defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. Looking through the adversarys 
eyes, Clausewitz concludes, If from the very start the other side feels that this is 
probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take 
the long way round and totally defeat the enemy.140 Consequently, neither the 
                                                 
138 Clausewitz, On War, p. 91. 
139 Clausewitz, On War, p. 91. The opponent can also increase the unacceptability of costs that have 
to be shouldered in order to end the war successfully. Among them are measures such as the wastage 
of the enemys forces, the loss of territory, the causation of general damage, and finally the exhaustion 
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140 Clausewitz, On War, p. 91. 
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destruction of the enemy forces nor the seizure of his provinces is preferable to more 
political or indirect measures. These include ... operations that have direct political 
repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliances, or to 
paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. Therefore, 
Clausewitz concludes, If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly 
improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the 
destruction of the opposing armies.141 
Finally, Clausewitz summarizes:  
We can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do 
not all involve the opponents outright defeat. They range from the 
destruction of the enemys forces, the conquest of his territory, to a 
temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate 
political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemys attacks. 
Any one of these may be used to overcome the enemys will: the choice 
depends on circumstances.142  
 
While ends pursued in wars are several, there is only one means: that is combat. 
Clausewitz justification of this proposition is straight forward: ... whenever armed 
forces, that is armed individuals, are used, the idea of combat must be present.143  
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemys 
forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual 
fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it 
came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. It follows that the 
destruction of the enemys force underlies all military actions; all plans are 
ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment. 
Consequently, all action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test 
of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be favorable. The 
decision by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash 
                                                 
141 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 92-93. 
142 Clausewitz, On War, p. 94. 
143 Clausewitz, On War, p. 95 Clausewitz warns all those who, due to philanthropist assumptions 
believe that ... there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much 
bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy 
that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness 
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payment is in commerce. Regardless how complex the relationship 
between the two parties, regardless how rarely settlements actually occur, 
they can never be entirely absent.144 
 
Again, that does not imply that combat or even decisive combats occur generally. 
However, it is important to ensure that the enemy is not going to seek a combat for 
destruction:  
If ... one of the two commanders is resolved to seek a decision through 
major battles, he will have an excellent chance of success if he is certain 
that his opponent is pursuing a different policy. Conversely, the 
commander who wishes to adopt different means can reasonably do so 
only if he assumes his opponent to be equally unwilling to resort to major 
battles.145 
 
Consequently, politicians as well as military commanders need to .... keep an eye 
on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him 
armed only with an ornamental rapier.146 By this, as Bassford argues, Clausewitz 
postulated no requirement for decisive battle, demanding only an awareness of the 
possibility.147 In the end, the probability of success in battle is the only reliable currency 
to achieve the intended strategic effect. 
 
Proposition 7: In war, morale, psychology, and character matter. 
 
Criticizing those theorists who disregard morale, Clausewitz argues that ... the 
moral elements are among the most important in war.148 In real war, every actor within 
the fascinating trinity, the people, the government, the army and its commander, is 
connected with specific moral elements. This is, particularly, true for the skill of the 
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145 Clausewitz, On War, p. 98. 
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commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.149 
These principal moral elements influence war and warfare. However, they are neither 
sufficient nor necessary. By contrast, deficits in one element can be compensated by 
advantages in the other.150  
Definitely, the commanders of military forces  the superior commander as well as subordinated commanders 
- need to possess sophisticated intellectual tools, a sense of judgment, and coup doeil.151 These requirements are 
necessary because of the nature of war as action in a resistant element152. Nevertheless, these rather intellectual 
capabilities are not sufficient to meet the requirements of leadership in war. Within his concept of the military genius, 
Clausewitz puts highest emphasis on courage, and character.153 A commander is supposed to act despite the fog of 
war (courage) and to stick to his convictions (character). Character is so important that Clausewitz develops even a 
guiding principle: Against any temptations to change his mind, the commander should ... in all doubtful cases ... stick 
to ones first opinion and to refuse to change unless forced to do so by a clear conviction.154  
As Aron argues,  
The relation of forces, by itself alone, does not decide anything. If it were decisive by itself, the struggle of 
the weak against the strong would become inconceivable, absurd. Now it is strategic theory which must come to the 
help of the weaker.155  
 
The experience and courage of the troops is mainly created by a series of victorious wars. In longer periods of 
peace, experience and courage cannot be entirely compensated through specific organization, education and training. 
Discipline, skill, goodwill, a certain pride, and high morale, are the attributes of an army trained in times of peace. 
They command respect, but they have no strength of their own.156 Therefore, compensation of this deficit by the 
virtue of the commander and a careful leadership must be applied.157  
                                                 
 
148 Clausewitz, On War, p. 184. 
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150 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 188-189. 
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154 Clausewitz, On War, p. 108.  
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156 Clausewitz, On War, p. 189. 
157 An army like this will be able to prevail only by virtue of its commander, never on its own. It 
must be led with more than normal caution until, after a series of victories and exertions, its inner 
strength will grow to fill its external panoply. We should take care never to confuse the real spirit of an 
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The people of war fighting states or entities can be involved morally differently. In the 18th century, cabinet 
wars were fought without participation of the people.158 The exclusion of the people had not only reduced the number 
of forces available but also the amount of morale of the forces. With the French Revolution,  
... war again became the business of the people... The people became a participant in war; instead of 
governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and 
efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits (...) There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all 
limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects.159 
 
 Additionally, the revolutionary wars serve as an example that not only rough but also civilized people might 
get stimulated with passion and hatred: Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate 
hatred for each other.160 Nevertheless, there is a limit of passion and hatred, set by intellect of the people161 and the 
dominance of rational political ends of the government. There is always a danger of escalation when the people get 
involved. Generally, in war as an act of force the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, 
but they will still affect it to some degree, and the extent to which they do will depend not on the level of civilization 
but on how important the conflicting interests are and on how long their conflict lasts.162 
 
Proposition 8: Balance of power mechanism within the relationship between 
offensive and defensive 
Clausewitz argues that the defensive, finally, is the stronger form of warfare. This 
superiority is not the result of an ethical preference for defense or of lack of offensive 
spirit, but of mere calculation of the disadvantages of attack. The attack suffers, for 
example, from diminishing force, proceeding steadily towards its culminating 
point.163 However, the defense, even in its mobile form with counter attacks, is restraint 
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to pursue only negative objects. Consequently, as a strategic advice, Clausewitz 
concludes: 
If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows 
that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be 
abandoned as soon as we are strong to pursue a positive object. When one 
has used defensive measures successfully, a more favorable balance of 
strength is usually created; thus, the natural course in war is to begin 
defensively and end by attacking.164 
 
The superiority of the defense is not only true for military operations but for the overall 
European balance of power. On this level Clausewitz reveals that, as Aron argues,  
The tendency towards equilibrium is not enough to prevent the temporary 
superiority of one state over all the others; that state ends up by perishing 
by fault of its very success, since it ranges against itself the majority of the 






Without a doubt, the assumption that Clausewitz is just a dreaming intellectual is 
untrue. By contrast, Clausewitz is a strategic mind who gathered experience in all 
dimensions of modern strategy. A closer look at the dimensions of modern strategy, as 
established by Gray166, reveals that Clausewitz not only discusses these dimensions in his 
theoretical writings but also worked on assignments that allowed him deep practical 
insights into their characteristics and interrelations. 
Reflecting upon the theory of war in general and strategy in particular, Clausewitz 
recognizes the necessity of scientific methods that are specifically tailored to match the 
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nature of war. The proposed intellectual tools may appear rather theoretical; however, 
realizing from history that general principles do not meet the complexity of war, 
Clausewitzs way of thinking is actually the only one that can provide reasonable advice, 
and enables the individual to come to sensible answers on strategic questions by himself. 
Generally, Clausewitzs advice does not reach the level of prescription on waging 
specific wars and making specific strategies. Instead, as Gray argues,  
The chief utility of a general theory of war and strategy lies in its ability 
not to point out lessons, but to isolate things that need thinking about. 
Theory provides insights and questions, not answers.167  
 
Furthermore, the Prussian philosopher of war provides awareness in some 
fundamental insights in warfare that always should be taken account of, for example,  
that every attack loses impetus as it progresses.168 Even more practically, Clausewitz 
provides a method of thinking that gives pragmatic advice on thinking through complex 
strategic challenges and organizing the strategic decision-making processes in order to 
come to sound results. 
Among all the dimensions that cause the complexity of war and strategy, 
Clausewitz determines no single master dimension. People, policies and politics, and the 
commander and his armed forces definitely possess a strong position; and disadvantages 
in some dimensions might be compensated by excellent performance in others. However, 
in strategy making, all dimensions  ranging from geography to time  need to be 
considered in a holistic approach. Consequently, policy and strategy makers have to think 
independently of any general principles about the requirements of their wars. 
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Arguing with Gray that an essential unity in strategy-making exists in all periods 
of history, and that the dimensions of war have been relevant in all strategic events,169 
Clausewitz actually becomes pragmatic to the greatest extent possible. However, the 
history of the Clausewitz interpretation, as described in the next chapter, reveals that, 
quite often, politicians, officials, and officers have not been properly understood 
Clausewitzs scientific methods and the multidimensionality of war and strategy; and that 
the evaluation of Clausewitzs person has often been far away from First Theorist of 
War170. 
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III. CLAUSEWITZS IMPACT AND INTERPRETATION IN EUROPE 
 
Since the end of the 17th century, war and strategy have become subject to 
scientific reasoning. The French Revolutionary Wars followed by Napoleons almost 
successful military bid for European hegemony have stimulated public discussion on 
strategy  on the side of the defeated states with the aim, evidently, of understanding 
Napoleons warfare to overcome him as soon as possible.171 At that time, Clausewitz, as 
officer and as theorist, stood in the center of the strategic discussion.  
Chapter III gives a short historical reconstruction of how strategists in Britain, 
France, and Germany understood Clausewitzs main propositions, contained in this study. 
Therein, the main emphasis is put on commonalities and diversities. Finally, some 
reasons for appreciating Clausewitzs main propositions in a specific, national way are 
discussed.172  
Four major commonalities of Clausewitzs interpretation in Britain, France, and 
Germany are detectable: first, the course of the Clausewitz interpretation was quite 
similar in all countries; secondly, the interpretation of Clausewitzs theoretical writings is 
significantly characterized by the neglect of the latters philosophy of science that he 
himself regarded as the main prerequisite for properly understanding war in general, and 
On War in particular; third, the interpretation of Clausewitz was not done in a 
comprehensive manner but rather a selective one. Strategists used Clausewitzs authority 
                                                 
171 For example, the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin (Denkwürdigkeiten der Militärischen 
Gesellschaft zu Berlin, Reprint of the edition Berlin, 1802-1805, Osnabrück, 1985.  
172 The analysis is based on two different levels as provided by the theory of international relations: 
the international system level, and the state level. See Singer, J.D., The Level-of-Analysis Problem in 
International Relations, in World Politics, Volume 14, Issue 1, The International System: Theoretical 
Essays (Oct. 1961), pp. 77-92. 
55 
to justify their own strategic ideas instead of trying to understand him comprehensively. 
This is, in particular, true for the cult of the offensive that characterized the period before 
World War I. Lastly, most officers in France, Britain, and, ironically, Germany read 
Clausewitz with the aim of finding simple solutions for current or future strategic 
challenges. 
 
A.        COMMONALITY  
 
  
1.  The Course of the Interpretation 
 
 
Clausewitzs On War was first published in Germany in 1832. However, in spite 
of some favorable reviews, the initial reception remained slow. It took more than 20 years 
to sell the first edition of 1,500 copies.173 In Britain and France, the first translations of 
Clausewitzs opus magna were made available surprisingly early. In Britain, the 
Clausewitz reception actually started as early as in the mid-1830s174, and in France a 
couple of years later.175 Nevertheless, as in Germany, the interest of British and French 
strategists in On War started at a low level.  
In the 70s, after the German victories in the unification wars and Helmuth von 
Moltkes public praise of Clausewitz, the preoccupation with Clausewitzs theoretical 
writings changed significantly.176 Moltkes remarks that Clausewitzs On War had been 
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essential for his self-education and leadership skills significantly promoted the interest of 
contemporary and upcoming officer generations.177 Now, officers all over Europe started 
to read Clausewitz in order to gain the insights that had made Moltkes tremendous 
success on the battlefield possible.178 Consequently, with regard to strategy, officers 
quite often adopted the shortcomings and failures of Moltkes Clausewitz-interpretation.  
The significantly increased interest in Clausewitzs theoretical writings was, in 
particular, true for French officers. However, their preoccupation with Clausewitz was 
not so much the inclination to study the reasons of the German victories but rather to 
reinforce French self-esteem after the humiliating defeat in 1870/71. This was achieved 
by subordinating Clausewitz to Napoleon. In the French view, Clausewitz and Moltke 
were disciples of Napoleon but did not reach his genius.179 Consequently, French officers 
interpreted Clausewitz through the narrow screen of the Napoleonic warfare.  
During the period before World War I, not only German but also British and 
French strategists strived to make their national strategies consistent with Clausewitzs 
theory. As Bassford reveals for Britain, Clausewitz was a significant and direct 
influence on British military thought in the period preceding World War I180. With 
regard to France, Aron concludes, Between 1885 and 1890 Clausewitz was part of the 
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training of the officers who drew up the staff plans early in the twentieth century and led 
the French armies in 1914.181 Consequently, Clausewitz  in a specific, national 
perception - had created a decisive impact on the major European belligerents strategies 
in the Great War.  
After the traumatic experience of World War I, On War lost popularity but, 
initially, remained a military classic if for no other reasons than to justify the military 
action of World War I182 or to understand the German military model.183 Now, the 
evaluation of Clausewitzs theoretical works was divided. Antagonists accused him of 
being responsible for the manslaughter of the World Wars184; protagonists stressed his 
original emphasis on limited war. Finally, by the end of World War II, Clausewitz was 
almost completely neglected, even in Germany.185 
After World War II, civilian scholars, Werner Hahlweg in Germany, Raymond 
Aron in France, and Michael Howard in Britain, initiated a Clausewitz-renaissance186. 
They revealed fakes from the original scripts and elaborated a new, more comprehensive 
interpretation of his theoretical works. Finally, they rediscovered Clausewitzs 
importance for current and future strategy-making. The appearance of scholars in the 
Clausewitz-interpretation was coincident with the strong position they gained in nuclear 
strategy-making. Confronted with the uncertainties of the atomic era and the Cold War, 
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European strategists, in particular in the German and French strategic communities, 
perceived Clausewitzs On War as fundamental to analyzing the European strategic 
environment. 
To sum up, the reception of Clausewitz in Europe followed a similar pattern. The 
19th century wars encouraged officers to become concerned with Clausewitz. World War 
I caused a decline in the Clausewitz reception that reached its peak in World War II. 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the contribution of civilian scholars has been 
decisive for the renaissance in the reception of Clausewitzs theoretical works. 
 
2. The Neglect of Philosophy of Science 
 
 
The significant disregard of any occupation with scientific methodology, even 
though Clausewitz emphasizes its importance so strongly187, determined the Clausewitz- 
interpretation in all major European countries. In Germany, it was Moltke who directed 
the interest in Clausewitz towards practical advice on conducting military campaigns, 
specifically through his definition of strategy as an expedient188. Then, it was one of 
his successor Chief of General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen189, who, in the preface of the 
fifth edition of On War, pointed out that Clausewitzs philosophical approach did not 
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please the contemporary reader.190 Some Clausewitz-experts even advised readers of 
On War to skip pages with philosophical content.191 This was, at least, a sincere self-
assessment of Hans von Seeckt, the Chief of the German Reichswehr from 1919 until 
1926, when he writes: regarding Clausewitz I am lacking the profound philosophical 
training; I am rather an empiricist with the talent to find sometimes a lucky 
formulation.192 In general, the commanders of the German military regarded the 
Prussian philosopher of war as a ... theoretician to be read by professors.193  
Similar statements can be found in Britain and France, also. Before Raymond 
Aron published his study on Clausewitz that broadly describes Clausewitzs dialectical 
method, French strategic theorists had enormous difficulties understanding Clausewitzs 
dialectical mode of argument. Some even accused Clausewitz of being a representative of 
the German fog or the teutonian mystic.194 Conducting only selective readings, even 
Frances high ranking strategists, Foch and Gilbert, took only those strategic dimensions 
from Clausewitzs theoretical work that were in line with their already developed 
strategic assumptions and propositions.195  
The European military strategists occupation with history serves as an excellent 
example illustrating that reflection upon scientific methods had been entirely neglected. 
Generally, officers dealing with military history did not apply methods that met the 
                                                 
190 Schlieffen, Einführung zur fünften Auflage des Werkes Vom Kriege (Berlin 1905), quoted in 
Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, p. 57. See also Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, p. 234. 
191 Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, p. 57. In 1943, an On War edition was published by F. von 
Cochenhausen, titled Vom Kriege, Um Veraltetes gekürzte Ausgabe (Leipzig 1943). 
192 Quoted in Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, p. 79. See also Wallach, Misperceptions of Clausewitz 
On War by the German Military, p. 217. 
193 Murray, Williamson, Clausewitz: Some Thoughts on What the Germans Got Right, in Michael 
I. Handel, (ed.), Clausewitz and modern Strategy, Cornwall: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1986, 
p. 270. 
194 Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, pp. 135-136. 
60 
standard of the academic research. In Germany, the poor quality of the militarys historic 
activities was revealed in the famous strategy-dispute between the German General 
Staff and its Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung on the one side, and the civilian scholar 
Hans Delbrück on the other side196. This dispute displayed that the historical methods 
applied by the German General Staff were neither compatible with the academic 
university standard nor with Clausewitzs critical method197. Occupying military history 
as an exclusive field of military research (Generalstabswissenschaft), the German 
General Staff attempted to draw military principles directly from the reconstruction of 
historical campaigns. For example, using Frederick the Great as historical justification, 
the General Staff concluded that the strategy of annihilation is the only reasonable 
strategy for Germany.  
In disputing these assumptions and conclusions198, Delbrück referred to 
Clausewitz, arguing that the latter developed a bipolar strategy (doppelpolige Strategie) 
that comprises annihilation and attrition as strategies of equal value199. Implicitly 
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criticizing even Moltke for his incomprehensive understanding of Clausewitzs theory of 
war, Delbrück demanded not only a radical shift in the interpretation of Clausewitzs 
works200 but also a significant alteration of Wilhelmine Germanys military strategy201. 
After several decades of discussions, Delbrücks position gained superiority, and after 
World War I, Delbrücks arguments were widely accepted202. In the end, the civilian 
scholar opened not only military history for academic research but also helped to liberate 
Clausewitzs theory of war from its un-dialectical understanding as a prescription for 
annihilation and absolute war.  
In Britain and France, a dispute similar to the strategy-dispute did not occur. In 
fact, there was no need because of the closer integration of policy, military, and society. 
However, military strategists, like their German counterparts, conducted rather superficial 
historical studies that aimed to deduce prescriptive principles of warfare. With regard to 
Britain203, Luvaas argues,  
They sought new order in history to provide a meaningful basis for their 
theories; they attempted to develop a reliable method for deducing 
scientific principles and for predicting future trends; and they endeavored 
to synthesize centuries of military experience in order to find signposts 
that modern armies had missed in the years before the war.204  
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Well known is Liddell Harts indirect approach205 that he deduced from his 
historical studies. In fact, neither the British strategists approach to history nor the 
prescription of the indirect approach would have found Clausewitzs consent. Clausewitz 
assessed the indirect approach as a reasonable course of action but was well aware of its 
limitations and prerequisites, as history showed.206 Fuller was very critical, also, as Reid 
points out: Though a valuable operational tool, the indirect approach cannot be 
employed dogmatically; under certain circumstances a direct approach is just as valuable. 
The indirect approach is not a cure-all ...207. Furthermore, even contemporary British 
officers regarded colonial warfare as a convincing example that absolute principles like 
the indirect approach did not meet the reality of war.208  
The Clausewitz-renaissance after World War II, initiated by civilian scholars, 
gave more attention to Clausewitzs philosophy of science. However, even in 1980, 
Hahlweg saw the necessity of highlighting the reconstruction of Clausewitzs 
philosophical methods which still remains an open research question.209  
In the end, the neglect of Clausewitzs philosophy of science, in particular the 
uncritical historical approach facilitated the un-dialectical understanding of Clausewitzs 
On War that took the philosophical concept of absolute war as a general prescription of 
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how to conduct war. Consequently, strategic theorists and commanders did not recognize 
or accept the limitations of war, imposed for example by policy and politics. Evidently, 
the neglect of philosophy of science and the determination to justify strategic plans by 
referring to Clausewitzs principles is one of the causal factors that contributed to the 
flawed application of strategy in World War I and World War II.  
 
3. The Desire for Simplicity 
 
 
In the 19th century, and even over long periods of the 20th century, officers all 
over Europe were rather inclined to be occupied with strategic theories that were easier to 
comprehend than Clausewitzs philosophical-theoretical approach. Desiring few 
principles and clear prescriptions, officers had to choose between two courses of 
preoccupation with strategic theory: the first course was to separate some of Clausewitzs 
propositions out of their context; the second course was to prefer Jominis competitive 
model that intentionally concentrated on very few strategic and operational principles. 
Finally, as a strange synthesis of the two courses, many officers tried to understand 
Clausewitzs On War by looking through the extremely narrow screen of Jominis 
strategic principles that, actually, belong to the realm of grand tactics.  
Jomini210 was one of the first who criticized Clausewitzs style of strategic 
thinking: No one could deny General von Clausewitzs great learning and fluent pen, but 
this pen, sometimes a little vagrant, is too pretentious, especially for a didactic discussion 
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in which simplicity and clarity should be the foremost merits.211 On the other side, in 
On War, Jomini became the target of Clausewitzs quite often-ironical critiques.212 As a 
reaction to Clausewitzs critiques, Jomini integrated some of the formers propositions 
into his latest publications without, however, committing significant changes.213 
Jomini considered himself as the first and only theorist who had revealed the 
secrets of Napoleons success in warfare, even ... to the point of predicting his actions 
with certainty.214 Explanation and prediction as purposes of scientific theory are derived 
from Jominis conviction that the complexity of war in general and of Napoleonic 
warfare in particular can be reduced to invariable scientific principles.215 The main 
principle determines military leaders to operate with the greatest force possible in a 
combined effort against the decisive point of enemy forces, such as flanks or lines of 
operation.216  
Intentionally, Jomini excludes several strategic dimensions, such as people, 
politics, and culture, from the theory of war and strategy. He even disconnected 
Napoleons military success from the conditions generated by the French Revolution. 
Until his death in 1869, the then Russian general was not willing to adjust his invariable 
principles although two social developments had apparently falsified his theory: the 
guerrilla warfare during the Spain and Russian campaigns where no decisive points were 
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detectable on which the forces could concentrate217; and then the industrialization, which 
offered unprecedented opportunities for mass mobilization, weapon production, and 
sustained warfare.  
Clausewitzs counter-arguments against the Jominian approach are evident and do 
not need to be reconstructed in detail. In On War, Clausewitz attacked the Jominian 
principle of numerical superiority as an oversimplification neglecting other factors that 
might influence the result of battles. On the other hand, Clausewitz agrees with Jomini on 
the benefits of outflanking the enemy  but only on a tactical level. Strategic outflanking 
requires a sufficient superiority that ensures being strong enough in ones own center of 
gravity. Even Napoleon, Clausewitz argues, did not commit himself to strategic 
outflanking although he was quite often superior in physical and moral strength.218 In 
general, Clausewitz rejected Jominis scientific approach; through historical evidence, he 
falsified main Jominian principles, at least partially219.  
Ironically, Jomini became by far more popular and influential than Clausewitz. 
This is because Jomini satisfied expectations of officers even if they were as different as 
German and French officers in the outbreak of World War I. All of them appreciated 
Jominis clear, simple, and repetitive message220, adorned with the reputation of being 
scientific. Facing the increasing complexity of war, some may have been tempted by a 
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kind of romantic desire to turn back to times when war seemed easily comprehensible. 
Additionally, was it not Napoleon himself who had given credit to Jominis theory by 
stating that Jomini had revealed the secrets of his strategy?221 In authoritarian states or 
societies, officers appreciated Jominis theory because its application promised success in 
war regardless of political and social conditions.222 Finally, as Shy points out, soldiers 
managed to read even Clausewitz in ways that twisted his meaning back into the 
comfortable Jominian formula223. This was in particular true for the period before 
World War I. 
 
 
4. The Cult of The Offensive 
 
 
As shown above, strategists often read Clausewitzs theoretical writings in a 
rather selective manner. The cult of the offensive serves as an illustrative example of how 
strategic fixations can narrow the understanding of multidimensional strategic theories.  
In the about 25-year period before World War I, France and Germany, in 
particular, developed military strategies for war in Europe that were offensive.224 
Strategists justified the necessity of the offensive with Clausewitzs theory of war, 
neglecting, or even intentionally suppressing, Clausewitzs emphasis on the advantages 
of the defense225. However, in spite of the Europe-wide cult of the offensive prior to 
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World War I, the European nation states justified their offensive strategies somewhat 
differently.  
Prussian-German strategy between 1866 and 1894 was well aware of the 
superiority of the defense, as proposed by Clausewitz.226 Nevertheless, Helmuth von 
Moltke developed the offensive strategy of strategic envelopment227 and practiced this 
strategy successfully against Austria in 1866 and against France in 1870/71. In fact, 
reflection upon Clausewitzs On War had assisted Moltke in his strategy-making. The 
Prussian Field Marshall recognized the prerequisites for the successful conduct of 
strategic envelopments, this being superiority of its own forces and the use of defense on 
the tactical level. This includes that strategic envelopment, with its long exposed flanks 
and lines of communication, requires the non-intervention of neighboring European 
states. In the end, Moltke succeeded in offensive wars because he fought them with 
superior military means without foreign intervention. 
With the prospect of two-front-wars at the beginning of the 90s, Germany had to 
face a strategic dilemma. This dilemma became worse because the increasing firepower 
of modern weaponry definitely supported the defense. Alfred von Schlieffens strategic 
planning was an attempt to overcome this dilemma by seeking a prompt decision through 
an offensive battle (Gesamtschlacht)228. Strongly affected by the Cannae-Battle of 
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Hannibal and Clausewitzs strategy of annihilation, Schlieffen planned a strategic 
envelopment of the opponent forces in France.229 Apparently, this plan followed the 
example of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.230 However, Schlieffen and his successor, 
Moltke the Younger, did not possess the necessary amount of resources231 to conduct a 
strategic envelopment in a two-front-war scenario with France and Russia. With the 
personnel strength of the French army significantly increased232 and the Russian army 
unexpectedly modernized, Moltke the Youngers merely military adjustments of the 
Schlieffen-Plan were not sufficient. In the end, policy and military strategy, both failed in 
what Clausewitz located at the core of strategy-making: reflecting upon strategy as a 
fascinating trinity; and relating end, ways, and means.233  
On the French side, the doctrine of the offensive, with Clausewitz as its celebrated 
main apostle, had been ... preached with evangelist fervor....234 Like Germany, the 
                                                 
 
thought of exchanging offense for defense, even in case of tremendous inferiority. Consequently, ... 
Schlieffens obsession with offensive and encirclement threw into complete oblivion all knowledge 
about defense (p. 222). Recently, Echevarria argues that Schlieffen developed different plans, 
comprising even the strategic defense (Echevarria II, After Clausewitz, p.194).  
229 Robbins, Keith, The First World War, Oxford, 1984, pp. 19 - 20. 
230 Moltke the Elder clearly forecasted that a swift or total victory in a two-front war would not be 
possible (Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, p. 253). 
231 Rothenberg, Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, p.  322.  
232 In 1913, France extended military service time from two to three years, thus increasing the 
personnel strength within a short period. See Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, p. 48; Robbins, 
The First World War, pp. 82-84; Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p. 109. 
233 The doctrine of short war through offensive was supported by several arguments. The first 
argument stated that a long war employing field armies of unprecedented personnel strength would 
cause the domestic economy, and even the entire fabric of civil society, to collapse (Strachan, 
European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp. 108, 128; Geyer, Michael, German Strategy in the Age 
of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 530). The second 
argument diagnosed a decreasing discipline and professionalism within mass armies (ibid, pp. 116-
117); as a compensation, human qualities had to be encouraged, mostly through offensive spirit. 
Finally - this argument should not be underestimated  the wars of 1866 and 1870/71 were won 
through offensive. 
234 Porch, Clausewitz and the French, 1871-1914, p. 287. 
69 
French military forces planned to launch a major offensive.235 However, as Porch 
summarizes, 
... a fairly comprehensive list of points (were) overlooked by French 
commanders in the Great War: the need to tailor strategy to ones military 
strength and political goals; the superiority of the defensive, especially for 
the weaker side; the value of a strategy of attrition in wearing down the 
enemys moral forces; the primacy of politics in the conduct of war.236 
 
In the end, although Clausewitz gained a high reputation in Germany and France 
prior to World War I, it was rather principles of the Napoleonic warfare as proposed by 
Jomini that influenced the strategic planning on both sides.237 The dominating Jominian 
Weltanschauung of the British, French, and German strategic minds had no capacity to 
question their strategic planning by understanding Clausewitz in a more comprehensive 
manner. 
After World War I, military leaders were more susceptible to Clausewitzs 
appreciation of the defense. In Germany, the main reason for this susceptibility was not a 
new approach to strategic theory but limitations of German military forces imposed by 
the Versailles Peace Treaty. Now, the Reichswehr developed a concept of flexible 
defense that would have found Clausewitzs support. As Wallach concludes, this ... 
meant in fact a conscious return to Clausewitz concept of flexible defense, a step which 
no German leader had dared to make during four long years of trench warfare.238 With 
Hitler, however, the relationship between offensive and defensive changed again.239 
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Offensive warfare was necessary to achieve Hitlers political and military goals. 
Encouraged by the initial success in the years between 1939 and 1941240, and faced with 
the US entering the war of attrition against Germany, Hitler decided to attack the Soviet 
Union. Clausewitz would have defied this endeavor because a war against Russia must be 
an unlimited war conducted with only limited means. In the end, the defeat of the 
Wehrmacht in Russia proves the truth of Clausewitzs propositions on the offensive and 




1. Primacy of Policy 
 
 
Clausewitzs proposition of war as the continuation of policies and politics with 
other means became subject to different national interpretations. In Prussia/Germany, 
Clausewitzs basic proposition was interpreted in a militaristic manner. By contrast, in 
Britain and France, countries with a firm democratic tradition, the proposition was 
accepted as self-evident. In the following section, the German understanding is discussed 
in more detail because of the catastrophes the German political-military experience 
caused in the 20th century.  
In Germany, Moltke was the first major military commander publicly to reject 
Clausewitzs proposition on civil-military relations. The Prussian Field Marshall 
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demanded that policy hand over command to the military once war had been declared.241 
In the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870/71, however, Moltke finally succumbed against 
Chancellor Bismarck242, although he continued to justify his point of view:  
Policy uses war for the attainment of its goals; it works decisively at the 
beginning and the end of war, so that indeed policy reserves for itself the 
right to increase its demands or to be satisfied with a lesser success. In this 
uncertainty, strategy must always direct its endeavors toward the highest 
aim attainable with available means. Strategy thus works best for the goals 
of policy, but in its actions is fully independent of policy.243   
 
Basically, Moltkes statement is in line with Clausewitzs dictum that politicians 
set the objectives of the war the military strategy has to achieve. He does not deny that 
politicians are interested in maintaining influence during the conduct of military 
operations. However, Moltke argues that, for the purpose of military success, any 
political influence should be abolished. What seems to be a rather pragmatic argument 
becomes finally a fatal reduction of national security strategy or grand strategy to military 
strategy. Moltke argues that, once war has been declared, the political aims are to be 
achieved exceptionally by using physical force. Thus, battle is crowned as the single 
means not only, as Clausewitz argues, for military strategy but for (national or grand) 
strategy as well. Furthermore, Moltke excludes all civilian expertise from the strategy-
making process in war. Consequently, the Chief of the German General Staff neither built 
institutions for coordination and cooperation with other state ministries or civilian 
                                                 
241 Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, pp. 64-73. 
242 The disputes between Bismarck and Moltke is discussed in Craig, The Politics of the Prussian 
Army, p. 207- 212;. Aron, Clausewitz. Philosopher of War, pp. 241-246. Basically, Bismarcks 
intervention in Moltkes military strategy was to prevent a decisive disturbance of the European 
balance. Evidently, Bismarck, although he never citied Clausewitz in any of his publications, acted 
politically in accordance with Clausewitz. See Hahlweg, Das Clausewitz-Bild, p. 73. 
243 Moltke, Helmuth von, On Strategy, in Moltke on the Art of war, pp. 44-45; see also Hahlweg, 
Das Clausewitz-Bild, pp. 65-73.  
72 
organizations nor educated general staff officers to cooperate with politicians and 
officials.  
Moltkes view on the relationship between policy and military was continued 
until 1933. Military commanders were heavily engaged in containing political influence 
from the realm of war and warfare.244 Confronted with mass politics, the Germany 
military intended to maintain a dichotomy between military and civilian society that 
excluded any public discourse about war and strategy.245 In sharp contrast to 
Clausewitzs proposition, military commanders who misunderstood war as the 
replacement of policy and politics with other means became even involved in policy-
making. For example, in the July crisis of 1914, the German General Staff contributed 
decisively to the outbreak of World War I.246 Heading towards major war, Moltke the 
Younger, then Chief of the German General Staff, did not coordinate his action that 
escalated the crisis to war with the responsible politicians. With regard to the strategic 
war plan, Historians have now established that the Schlieffen Plan was in fact known to 
the chancellors though not apparently to Admiral Tirpitz, but it was never jointly 
discussed by the various authorities, civil and military, whereas the French plans were 
studied by the supreme war council, chaired by the prime minister.247 Two years later, 
the German General Staff, confronted with the extremely stressful military situations of 
stalemate and enormous consumption of human and material resources, established a 
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silent military dictatorship248 that protected itself against any political intervention 
from the outside, even from the emperor. Finally, the General Staff established the 
institutional preconditions for conducting total war. In 1918, after the last strategic 
offensives had failed, the responsible military commanders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 
blamed the politicians.249 Although apparently paradoxical, this was absolutely in line 
with the Moltkean definition of civil-military relations.  
Ludendorff, in 1922, published a book in which he criticized Clausewitzs main 
proposition on the relationship between policy and war. He argued that policy only 
comprises foreign policy, and that all national policies have to serve the war. Later, in 
1935, Ludendorff even argued that Clausewitz is not up to date any more. Now, he 
actually emphasizes the primacy of the military. By contrast, policy becomes a means of 
war. Thus, Ludendorff became the first German who actually broke with Clausewitz 
publicly: All theories of Clausewitz have to be thrown overboard.250 
Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the German Reichswehr (1920-1926), highlighted the 
intercourse and mutual influence between policy and military. However, in real politics, 
von Seeckt successfully maintained the Reichswehr as an independent power, as a state 
within the state, clearly separated from the institutions of the newly established 
Weimarer parliamentary democracy.251 In the early thirties, when confronted with the 
prospect of civil war, Reichswehr officers acted politically by using their personal 
influence on President (and former Field Marshall) Paul von Hindenburg. Finally, 
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officers brought Hitler to power in 1933.252 Apparently, a twofold continuity existed 
within the German military: first, when confronted with the danger of war or civil war, 
military commanders intervened politically justified by the militaristic misunderstanding 
of Clausewitzs dictum on war as continuation of policy. Second, officers excluded 
politicians and other civilians from the making of military strategies, thereby referring to 
Moltkes prescription that the militaristic reduction of strategy is a necessary 
precondition for success in war. Thus, they reduced the efficiency of the states 
administration in those situations when it was most needed: that is in war. 
Serving in democracies with a strong tradition of clearly defined civil-military 
relations, British and French strategic theorists have not given significant attention to 
Clausewitzs proposition of war as the continuation of policies and politics. With regard 
to Britain, Bassford argues,  
The British never showed any propensity for rejecting Clausewitzs 
connection between war and politics (although it was a focus of their 
suspicions of Germany). They were not much interested in this aspect of 
On War in the nineteenth century, largely because  as Wellingtons 
remarks show  they were quite aware of the connection.253 
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Actually, as Strachan reveals, the British army was more engaged in pluralistic 
politics than expected.254 The phenomenon of wartime field commanders getting 
involved in disputes with politicians occurred also in the British system.255  And even 
some British officers, in line with Moltke,  argued that the officer must be apolitical and 
that  unfettered control brought success, political subordination failure.256 
Nevertheless, even in fierce disputes with politicians, officers did not fundamentally 
question the principle that politicians guide military strategy.  
Assuming Clausewitzs major proposition as self-evident, British and French 
strategists did not recognize that the political conclusion of Clausewitzs dictum on the 
primacy of politics was not necessarily the establishment of a democratic system but the 
establishment of the states administration in accordance with the rational principles of 
efficiency and accountability257. Britain, being a parliamentary monarchy and the 
centerpiece of an empire, possessed decision-making institutions that definitely reflected 
the complexity of strategy. In France, by contrast, political crises and internal weakness 
limited the states efficiency and accountability, with severe impacts on strategy 
making.258 
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2. Alternative Strategic Concepts 
 
After the defeat of Napoleon, Europe was characterized by the Pax Britannica 
that was based on the British virtual monopoly among European powers of oversea 
colonies, and the virtual monopoly of world-wide naval power. Later, the Crimean War 
in 1856, and, at the end of the century, the German threat showed the limitations of a 
strategy that was mainly focused on naval supremacy. During World War I, establishing 
a stalemate in the North Sea, Britain became involved in continental warfare in a way it 
was not prepared for.259 In order to avoid a repetition of the catastrophe of the Great War, 
British strategists sought to develop a new model of strategic theory. They intended to 
create an alternative to, what they assumed was, the continental model that so far had 
dominated the strategic culture and the actual fighting of war in Europe. This attempt is 
closely connected with the names of Fuller and Liddell Hart. However, in spite of their 
well-known and quite often devastating critiques imposed on Clausewitz260, Fuller and 
Liddell Hart are astonishingly in line with Clausewitzs main propositions. Paradoxically, 
Liddell Hart261 and, in particular, Fuller would have supported main theoretical 
propositions of the Prussian philosopher of war if they had appropriately interpreted 
them. Without a doubt, their scientific approach in developing a theory of war and 
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strategy was different from Clausewitzs. However, nearly all of Fullers and Liddell 
Harts strategic propositions and principles are anticipated in Clausewitzs On War but in 
a more comprehensively reflective manner. In the following, main propositions of the 
Prussian and the British strategists are discussed comparatively.  
First of all, both British strategists, like Clausewitz, recognized that war is a social 
phenomenon. As Reid argues, Fuller and Liddell Hart were to pioneer in Britain ... the 
technique of studying warfare in the round as a social phenomenon.262 Fuller, who 
already considers the impact of mass democracy on strategy263, writes: I have shown 
that the forces of war and those of life generally are synonymous.264 From this point of 
view, Fuller comes to the same conclusions that Clausewitz has drawn a century before: 
Warfare to be a sane political instrument demands a sane political end, and to be 
attainable that end must be strategically possible265. As shown above, the primacy of 
policy was a relatively unquestioned principle in Britain, in practice as well as in theory. 
Liddell Hart states clearly, The military objective is only the means to a political end. 
Also his conclusions are absolutely in line with Clausewitzs position: Hence the 
military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic 
condition that policy does not demand what is militarily  that, is practically, 
impossible.266 Furthermore, as Fuller argues, strategists are not only to reflect national 
policies but must also be integrated in the national decision-making processes. Like 
Clausewitz, Fuller draws the institutional consequence that the commander of the army 
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should be a long-standing member of the government in order to assure that strategy 
marches in close step with policy and politics267. In the end, Liddell Hart and Fuller 
understand war as the Clausewitzian fascinating trinity and have drawn the same 
institutional conclusions as the Prussian philosopher of war. 
Secondly, both, Fuller and Liddell Hart, highlight that peace is the ultimate aim of 
war. The former argues that war has a creative purpose, ... which is to create a better 
state of conditions, and not merely to destroy an existing discontent268. The creation of 
a better state of conditions does not necessarily imply the destruction of the enemy 
forces. By contrast, The idea that an enemy must be destroyed is only legitimate when it 
leads to a profitable state of peacefulness.269 Generally, Liddell Hart is in line with 
Fullers argument. Nevertheless, based on his differentiation between grand strategy and 
military strategy, Liddell Hart transferred the aim of peace into the realm of grand 
strategy.270 He argues,  
... while the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks 
beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the 
various instruments, but also regulate their use as to avoid damage to the 
future state of peace  for its security and prosperity.271  
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Liddell Hart, in particular, criticizes Clausewitz for disregarding the aim of peace 
in military strategic thinking and for too strongly emphasizing the tactical victory and the 
destruction the enemy forces:  
The object in war is to attain a better peace  even if only from your own 
point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to 
the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitzs definition 
of war as a continuation of policy by other means  the prolongation of 
that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be 
borne in mind. A State which expends its strength to the point of 
exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future.272  
 
However, Liddell Harts critique of Clausewitz is positively not justified. In 
contrast to Liddell Harts critique, Clausewitz argued that the political conception of 
peace should determine military strategy permanently.273 Clausewitzs holistic approach, 
in particular the application of hermeneutics and dialectics, connects war and peace very 
closely.274 Thus, Clausewitz anchors the idea of peace not only in the realm of grand 
strategy but also plants it deeply into the mind of the military strategist. 
A second main thrust of Liddell Harts critique towards Clausewitz is directed 
against the latters proposition that battle is the single means in war. First, Liddell Hart 
argues that battles must be avoided to the greatest extend possible because they also 
weaken the victors of battles. Secondly, the British Captain points out that (grand) 
strategy possesses several different means, military and non-military: Just as the military 
means is only one of the means to the end of grand strategy  one of the instruments in 
the surgeons case  so battle is only one of the means to the end of strategy.275 If, 
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nevertheless, battle proofs necessary, then ... the aim of strategy must be to bring about 
this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. (...) The perfection of strategy 
would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting276. Thus, Liddell 
Hart advocates bloodless victories as the ultimate goal of strategy.  
Finally, Liddell Hart condenses his arguments in the principle that the true aim of 
the strategist ... is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so 
advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle 
is sure to achieve this.277 Again, this is generally in line with Clausewitzs arguments 
although the latter clearly states that in war only a single means is available, and that is 
battle. By emphasizing battles as the single means of strategy, Clausewitz rejected the 
contemporary opinion of kind-hearted people ... that there was some ingenious way to 
disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed... and that ... this is the true 
goal of the art of war278. Instead, Clausewitz increases awareness of the possibility of 
battles in wars; every party must be prepared if the adversary actually seeks battle. But, 
definitely, Clausewitz does not prescribe to go for battle.  
Liddell Harts demand for ... sound calculation and co-ordination of the end and 
the means279 as an elementary prerequisite for success in war is, again, absolutely in line 
with Clausewitz. Viewing his Prussian counterpart as the apostle of unlimited war, 
Liddell Hart emphasizes limited military aims, relying on the strategic factor of time and 
on a rather indirect approach:  
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When a government appreciates that the enemy has the military 
superiority, either in general or in a particular theatre, it may wisely enjoin 
a strategy of limited aim. It may desire to wait until the balance of force 
can be changed by the intervention of allies or by the transfer of forces 
from another theatre. It may desire to wait, or even to limit its military 
effort permanently, while economic or naval action decides the issue.280 
 
Again, Clausewitz has integrated these arguments into his theory of war and 
strategy.281 However, he would have pointed out that other dimensions of war may 
compensate military inferiority, that waiting does not necessarily increase its own 
military capacities, and that the indirect approach depends on conditions that are not 
always given282. 
Like Clausewitz, Fuller and Liddell Hart reflect upon uncertainty as a major 
element of war. Liddell Hart argues that the main causation of the wars uncertainty lies 
in his nature as a two-party affair that comprises a thinking adversary. Nevertheless, 
while Clausewitz draw some elementary conclusions about the nature of war in general 
and the importance of the military genius in particular, Liddell Hart remains more on the 
level of utilitarian prescription. However, even Liddell Harts insights can be traced back 
to Clausewitzs On War: for example, that the commander has to take advantage of 
unexpected situations; that alternative objectives and plans have to be developed to gain 
flexibility; and that surprise and rear attacks can demoralize the front.283  
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Several further common propositions can be detected between Fuller and Liddell 
Hart on the one side, and Clauswitz on the other side.284 In the end, the comparison of 
some main propositions shows a significant consensus in important elements of strategic 
theory between the Prussian and the two British strategists, although the latter intended to 
develop an alternative, anti-continental strategic theory. However, Fullers and, in 
particular, Liddell Harts misinterpretation of Clausewitz darkened this fundamental 
consensus. As Bassford summarizes, Particularly damaging were Liddell Harts 
unreasonable attacks, which left a generation of military commentators confused about 
the relationship between the philosophers theories and those of his alleged 
misinterpreters.285 Clausewitz became a victim of the British theorists intention to 
create of strategy that is different from the continental model. His name was closely 
linked with the continental model of strategy that completely failed in World War I. 
Consequently, Fuller and Liddell Hart confounded Clausewitzs theory of war and 
strategy with the implemented strategy in World War I. Even the correction of Liddell 
Harts Clausewitz interpretation by German expatriates286 and by scholars, in particular 
Michael Eliot Howard, were not sufficient to destroy the British tradition of trashing 
Clausewitz. The British historian John Keegan provides an excellent example of the 
continuation of Liddell Harts wrong but effective Clausewitz interpretation.287  
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The following analysis of the Clausewitz interpretation is focused on the question 
of why British, French, and German strategic theorists understood him in a specific, 
national way. On the international and state levels of analysis, several reasons can be 
identified. 
 
1. International Level 
 
The international systems level provides some impressive explanations for the 
misinterpretation of Clausewitzs proposition, (1) in particular for the German militaristic 
misinterpretation of the supremacy of policy, (2) for the primacy of the offensive that 
astonishes, in particular, in the case of France in World War I, and (3) for the alternative 
British way of warfare. 
(1) The security situation of Germany, located in the heart of Europe, contributed 
decisively to the misinterpretation of Clausewitzs proposition of war as the continuation 
of policies and politics with other means. As described above, the German unification 
wars accelerated the militarys preoccupation with Clausewitzs On War. The mindset 
that guided this preoccupation was absolutely influenced by the German security 
situation. The united Germany had changed the traditional European balance of power 
that was based on strong flanks and a weak center.288 Germany perceived itself as a state 
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that, like Prussia, was surrounded by potentially opponent states that might even built 
alliances in order to confront it with multi-front-wars. Consequently, the political-military 
elites sought to continue what had been the traditional policy of the Prussian state: the 
making of the Prussian state was essentially based on war making or at least on constant 
preparation for war-making.  
Similar, the political-military elite expected Germany to survive only if it was 
established as a garrison state (Militärstaat) with the officer corps as social elite 
(staatstragende Schicht). Thus, a political culture became dominant fostering not civil 
society but militarism, and stimulating military intervention into politics, in particular in 
situations when the survival of the state was perceived as externally or internally 
threatened.  
To conclude, Germany proved the strong correlation between the security 
situations, the political culture of the state, and the military intervention into politics.289 
The more the states security is threatened, and the less state and society are tied to a 
democratic culture, the more likely the military dominates policies and politics. If even 
the survival of the state is in danger, the military establishes a strong bureaucratic 
position that reinforces its ability to intervene politically. Consequently, the perceived 
security situation allowed the German political-military elite to understand Clausewitzs 
proposition of war as continuation of policies and politics in two ways: first, the political 
and military elite regards Clausewitzs proposition as irrelevant to the specific German 
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case; or secondly, the elite  intentionally  amends the proposition, and turns it into 
the opposite.290 
(2) In World War I, Britain, France, and Germany developed and implemented 
offensive strategies. This predisposition appears to be quite paradoxical, because the new 
military technology favored the defense, in particular on the tactical level. However, 
struggling with the proper integration of modern technologies in strategy, operation, and 
tactics, all main belligerent states agreed on the primacy of the offensive, thereby being 
well aware of the likelihood of heavy losses291. Echevarria II points out that this 
agreement was not an irrational decision. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the theories 
developed during this time did not dismiss the importance of firepower merely to retreat 
into a blind faith in the primacy of psychological factors and an atavistic cult of the 
offensive.292 Instead, reasons can be traced back to the desire to reduce complexity, to 
contain the impact of pacifism and socialism, and to meet the requirements of the 
globalized economy.  
First, the impact of industrialization and modern technology in warfare caused a 
crisis of tactics that dominated the institutional and individual intellectual capacities. 
Therefore, reduction of complexity was sought and, finally found, in the emphatic 
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accentuation of the annihilation idea.293 Officers perceived the offensive as the single 
strategic tool to meet the technical revolution in military affairs.  
Secondly, the traditional warrior spirit of armies appeared to be threatened by an 
international phenomenon: this was the Europe-wide increasing political influence of 
pacifism and socialism. Not only Germany but also Britain and France launched several 
activities against these perceived threats294, among them the ideology of the offensive. 
Furthermore, military commanders assessed neither the people nor the economic 
system as reliable to sustain long lasting wars.295 Facing all these restraints, military 
commanders focused their reading of On War on Clausewitzs elaboration on the 
offensive, without reflecting upon its disadvantages and Clausewitzs general preference 
of the defense. 
The military commanders decision for offensive strategies is astonishing in 
particular in the case of France. Since 1871, with Germanys relative power in Europe 
rising, France recognized its increasing numerical inferiority.296 Unfortunately, no 
reliable allies, neither Russia nor Britain, were available in the aftermath of this 
humiliating defeat. Additionally, the internal political situation in France remained 
characterized by political disunity. Consequently, the strategic challenge for French 
                                                 
293 Schlieffen perceived the ideal of annihilation as the gauge of Clausewitzs On War and expressed 
this in the introduction of the 5th edition: ... the permanent merit of the work On War lies ... in its 
emphatic accentuation of the annihilation idea (quoted in Wallach, Misperceptions of Clausewitz On 
War by the German Military, p. 215). 
294 Action comprised the support of specific literature and the creation of youth organization 
(Echevarria II, After Clausewitz, p. 115).  
295 In the Fin de siecle, all major European countries realized that major war would be long and that 
war would threaten the economic and social basis. As Jan Bogomil Bloch has argued in The Future of 
War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects, modern war would quickly bankrupt European 
states and place such a strain on its societies that revolution would follow. For further discussion see 
Echevarria II, After Clausewitz, pp. 85-93. 
87 
strategists was how to compensate the German numerical superiority. Ironically, 
Clausewitz seems to have the answer French strategists were looking for: that morale can 
compensate numerical inferiority. Actually, it is one of Clausewitzs main insights that 
military strength is a product of weapons and will. And morale, as Clausewitz reveals 
from military history, can be initiated and maintained through offensive action. 
Therefore, as Porch argues, To an army in such a state of political confusion and 
material disarray, a doctrine which preached the superiority of moral force was 
naturally attractive.297 If all other factors were equal, superiority within the moral 
dimension would prove decisive.298 In the end, inferiority in the European balance of 
power and the bad conditions of the French state drove French strategic theorists to find 
the solution in offensive military action and to find the theoretical justification in 
Clausewitz who was assumed as one of Napoleons disciples. 
(3) The splendid isolation has enabled Britain to choose a strategic concept that 
is different to those of the continental European states. Britain could afford to rely on 
naval supremacy, although sea power had only limited relevance for war on the European 
continent.299 Maintaining only small land forces, Britain followed a sound balance-of-
power policy. As Fuller argues,  
As long as our command of the sea was maintained, invasion was 
impossible, yet this very command meant that our land forces must remain 
weak, not only because the people ... saw no necessity for a large army, 
but because, had we added such an army to our all-powerful fleet, we 
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should have threatened the existence of every Continental nation, and ... 
forced them to enter into coalition against us.300  
 
In order to maintain naval supremacy and prevent invasion, Britain pursued a 
strategy that is characterized by the following elements: first, in crisis situations and in 
war, Britain must have continental allies if only to land army contingents on the 
European continent; secondly, the protection of Belgium and the Netherlands is of utmost 
importance to land an army and to prevent enemy landings; third, Britain could not allow 
any great powers to seize command of the sea while they simultaneously gained 
dominion on land; fourth, an imbalance of power between France and Germany should be 
avoided301.  
These considerations put specific emphasis on the strategic level of military 
operations before thinking about the operational and tactical implementation. This might 
have made British strategists more sensitive to Clausewitzs strategic deliberations than 
the continental European strategists. As Murray argues, It is not surprising that Anglo-
Americans, who must think first of getting to the battlefield, should concentrate on the 
strategic and political level of On War, while the Prussians and their successors, the 
Germans, with immediate vulnerabilities on land would gravitate to Clausewitzs 
thoughts in the operational and tactical sphere.302 
In the end, Fullers and Liddell Harts rejection of the centrality of battle ... may 
result from the fact that British military operations  owing to the maritime form of 
                                                 
300 Fuller to DEyncourt, 7 May 1920, DEyncourt Paper DEY 22, National Maritime Museum, 
Greenwich, quoted in Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p. 99. 
301 Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, pp. 103-6. Thus, a policy that did not sustain France 
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aerial blockade that was so detrimental to British security (p. 106) 
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British power projection, the nature of the coalition warfare in which Britain was usually 
involved, the salient economic elements thereof, and the scarcity of British military 
manpower  almost always emphasized delay and attrition over offensive combat.303 
Furthermore, because of its splendid isolation, the naval supremacy, and the superior 
economic resources of the British Empire, Britain could take advantage of time as a 
main strategic dimension.  
All these strategic advantages Britain possessed were not valid for France and 
Germany. These two countries were forced to rely on land forces and fast operations 
against the decisive points of the enemy. Britain, by contrast, could choose a secondary 
area of operations in which small land forces, avoiding battle or at least fighting battles 
under favorable conditions, could gain disproportional military influence.304 Because of 
Britains strategically splendid location in terms of geopolitics and favorable position in 
terms of balance-of-power policies, British strategists assessed Clausewitzs theoretical 
works rather as a reflection of the continental warfare. However, as previously  shown, 
Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy can be easily applied to Britains strategic 
specifications. In fact, On War discusses several dimensions and elements that British 
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2. State Level 
 
The state level analysis provides some instructive explanations for the 
misinterpretation of Clausewitzs proposition, (1) in particular for Germanys militaristic 
misinterpretation of the supremacy of policy, (2) for the neglect of philosophy of science; 
(3) for the French emphasis of the offensive; and (4) for the lack of strategic minds. 
(1) The German military victories between 1864 and 1871 and the unification of 
Germany led to the glorification of the officer corps by large groups within German 
society. The officer corps as the highest representation of German nationalism now 
attracted even liberals, who had struggled against the political restoration in the first half 
of the 19th century. The officer corps regarded all other social groups as enemies of the 
state (staatsgefährdend) not supporting German nationalism. The German military, 
realizing that the people have decisive influence on the military power of a nation state, 
became concerned about the impact of the increasing liberal and social democratic 
political movements on strategy-making. They reacted in a threefold manner: first, by 
concentrating on annihilation because the populace was not supposed to support long- 
lasting wars; second, by trying to separate these groups from any participation in the 
strategic decision-making process; and third, by influencing the political opinions of the 
population, in particular by trying to restrict the youth from liberal and social democratic 
opinions.  
By doing this, the Wilhelmine military system recognized Clausewitzs 
fascinating trinity but tried to maintain the dominance of the commander and the army 
in the interrelationship with the government and the people. For this purpose, Clausewitz 
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needed to be interpreted in a way that was not reconcilable with his original insights. 
Comparing the alteration of the text regarding the relationship between policy and war 
with the text passages dealing with the defense, Wallach concludes, ... it is obvious that 
they could not tolerate the idea of the political agency dominating war, and wished to 
discourage any discussion of his particular subject.305 Consequently, the German 
military elite prevented any attempt to find institutional regulations in the realm of 
strategy-making that involved political expertise: ... contrary to the established practice 
in other countries, the Germans never established an institution where statesmen and 
generals together discussed war policy.306 
(2) The disregard of Clausewitzs philosophy of science was predominately 
caused by the qualifications of the officer corps. In general, the education of officers in 
all European countries was not sufficient to reach the quality Clausewitz assumed 
required for military leaders, at least in general staff assignments. In Germany, this was 
true mainly for two reasons. First of all, the Prussian-German army struggled to introduce 
the highest school-leaving examination at secondary schools (Abitur) as a mandatory 
prerequisite for the officer commission.307 Secondly, military education became 
increasingly focused on craftsman-like conceptions offering practical guide  a kind of 
do and do not - for the conduct of war.308 Consequently, military education became 
focused on operational and tactical skills, while strategy fell between the cracks.309  
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This is also true for policies and politics as subject in military curricula. Instead of 
enhancing political education to understand the modernization process, the German 
military established the idealtyp of the apolitical soldier, as exemplified by Schlieffen310. 
The peak of this development was reached in the German Wehrmacht, particularly during 
World War II. 311 As a result of this long-lasting development, German general staff 
officers did not possess the intellectual tools neither to reflect upon strategy nor to 
understand Clausewitzs On War.  
A second important reason that caused the neglect and misunderstanding of 
Clausewitzs philosophy of science is tied to the different scientific cultures, in particular 
between Britain and Germany. In general, the scientific culture in Germany is 
characterized by a higher relevance of philosophical-theoretical reflections. In Britain, by 
contrast, empiricism and pragmatism were preferred. 
Until the 60s of the 20th century, when a realistic turn in social sciences was 
conducted in Germany, philosophical reflection (Geisteswissenschaften) dominated the 
scientific discourse.312 However, since the German military excluded academic discourse 
from military matters, the philosophical culture in Germany could not contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of Clausewitz philosophy of war among officers. 
Even Moltke the Younger, although interested in philosophy, and Walther Reinhardt, 
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although a reformer of the officer education in the Reichswehr313, neglected Clausewitz 
and followed Schlieffens more practical approach to strategic theory.  
The British way of strategic thinking is, by contrast, supposed to be rather 
pragmatic.314 Bassford confirms this view by stating, It is true that theory was always 
suspect in British eyes....315 Seen through this tradition, Clausewitz was assessed as a 
strategic theorist who ... had acquired a philosophical mode of expression without 
developing a truly philosophical mind316. In spite of this critique, a major commonality 
in the theoretical approach to strategy existed between Fuller and Clausewitz. Both wrote 
books to teach officers how to think through military problems.317 However, 
Clausewitzs and Fullers approach in this common endeavor was different: While 
Clausewitz was pragmatic in the sense of providing a theory for self-education, Fuller 
provided not only scientific explanations and prediction but also concrete principles for 
direct action. As Luvaas summarizes,  
Clausewitz had developed theory to provide the framework for a serious 
study of wars and campaigns; Fuller wanted to develop a scientific method 
of analysis that would improve the armys efficiency by imparting useful 
knowledge. To Clausewitz theory should be study, not doctrine, its role 
was to guide the commander in his self-education. To Fuller it was 
imperative to study war with methods of science so that the conditions of 
the next conflict might be accurately forecast.318  
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In the end, a different understanding of pragmatic theory contributed to Fullers 
misunderstanding and depreciation of Clausewitzs On War.319  
The difference between Clausewitzs rather philosophical approach and the 
British strive for empirical laws is reflected in the understanding of strategic theory as a 
science or rather an art.320 Basically, Fuller, Liddell Hart, and Clausewitz criticized the 
strategic concepts of Bülow or Jomini. All refused to treat strategy purely quantitatively 
or geometrically or as a matter of concentrating superior force321. In the end, while Fuller 
connected strategy to the empirical sciences prevailing in Britain, Clausewitz invented his 
own science for the realm of strategy, connected to the contemporary philosophical 
discussion and in line with the Geisteswissenschaften to be developed nearly 100 years 
later.  
(3) The French emphasis of the offensive in World War I, as mentioned above, 
was caused by a deep-seated inferiority complex against its eastern neighbor. In the 
French perception, the inferiority was not only caused by the lower number of soldiers 
and weapons but also by Frances political discord and bureaucratic confusion. 
Encountering the inferior condition of the French state and society, strategists assessed 
the  
... Clausewitzian moral force ... (as) an excellent cure for all the ills 
which afflicted the French army  political divisions, deficiencies in 
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armament. (...) Moral force united left and right, Dreyfusard and anti-
Dreyfusard, colonial and metropolitan.322  
 
However, the question remained what contents the moral force should contain. 
In France, because of the higher influence of socialist parties, the moral force was 
assumed to become inspirited by the militarys active engagement in the development of 
democracy323. Focused on the moral dimension of war and its implications for domestic 
policies, French strategists did not appreciate what Clausewitz named the military 
virtues and the capability of an army to actually fight battles. 
The French inferiority complex comprised even the quality of strategic theory and 
doctrine. 
Europeans interested in military theory looked for instruction to 
Clausewitz, Moltke, and von der Goltz, not to Gilbert, Bonnal, and Foch. 
A combination of lack of time and lack of intellectual depth may have 
caused French theorists like Foch to fall back on selective formulas and 
cliches as substitutes for the more profoundly pondered and documented 
German theories.324 
 
This lack of strategic expertise  in theory as well as in practice  was caused by a 
military educational system that, prior to World War I, provided no general staff officers 
comparable with the German standard. As Porch summarizes, So while Germany 
possessed a true institution of higher military learning, France organized a vocational 
school.325  
(4) The proper understanding of Clausewitz depends on the availability of 
strategic minds. Germany, although possessing a general staff and high-level military 
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education facilities, lost the strategic dimension of war by concentrating on operational 
and tactical solutions of strategic challenges.326 Ludendorffs answer on the strategic 
goals of the German offensives in spring 1918 serves as an excellent example of this 
decline in strategic thinking: We will punch a hole in their line. For the rest, we will 
see. As Gray comments, Although admirably flexible, such an approach translates in 
practice into pure expediency, tactical pragmatism innocent of strategic command.327 
With Ludendorff, the Moltkian reduction of Clausewitzs definition of strategy found its 
own reductionist perfection. From this point of view, Clausewitz appears to be one of the 
last military strategists in Germany. Under his successors, The army made operational 
solutions do duty for problems that were as much economic as political.328 Officers tried 
to solve political and military problems by improper means: political problems were 
confronted with military means;329 and strategic problems were confronted with 
operational and tactical means330. Therefore, German commanders did not strongly 
considered what Clausewitz emphasized: that the enemy is a thinking enemy that adapts 
to new weapons or tactics, and finally develops a successful countermeasure.331 To 
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summarize, The principal German problem in both world wars was that the country 
lacked a competent strategy-making, and strategy-reviewing, body.  
Furthermore, most of the Wehrmacht generals332 who conducted campaigns 
successfully at the operational level, disregarded Clausewitzs advice: commanders are 
justified, in every single case, to demand that policy not come into contradiction with the 
nature of the military mean. In the end, when confronted with strict political power, 
German generals often obeyed in spite of their own convictions which were derived from 
their military professionalism.  
In Britain before World War I, no strategic culture existed. One major reason is 
tracable to the regimental system. As Reid argues, the regimental system is less a 
dynamic instrument of organization preparing for the next war than a form of social 
gathering in which its members feel comfortable and exhibit those fierce tribal loyalties 
to which the British are so prone.333 Although this regimental system has remained until 
today, the strategic culture is Britain changed radically with the traumatic experience of 
World War I: 
That before 1914 Great Britain produced no military theorist of the first 
water, yet after 1918 produced two, requires some comment. It had a very 
great deal to do with Fuller and Liddell Harts experience of the First 
World War. Their work was a response to this traumatic experience, and 
the widespread feeling, evident among junior officers, that something had 
gone awfully wrong and this something ought to be rectified before the 
next war. As comparatively junior officers, Fuller and Liddell Hart were 
representative figures of this reforming impulse.334  
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These two strategic theorists dominated the Clausewitz interpretation in Britain 
after World War I and continue to influence it until today. In order to underline their 
alternative approach to strategy, Fuller and Liddell Hart ... persisted in connecting 
Clausewitz to the errors of the Great War that they wished to extirpate....335 Therefore, it 
was difficult for them to integrate Clausewitz in their own strategies, although this, as the 
comparison showed, would have been quite easily possible. Besides the intend to write a 
new strategic theory, national prejudices, reinforced by the War and the Nazism in 
Germany after 1933, might have led to a ... nationalistic reluctance of British authors to 
align themselves too closely with any foreign thinker on war, especially the militarily 




The main assumption of this study is that the development of a common strategic 
paradigm will facilitate political integration and military cooperation within the EU. 
Proposing that Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy may serve as the framework of 
the desirable common strategic paradigm, this study reveals several commonalities and 
diversities in the Clausewitz interpretation between Britain, France, and Germany. 
Commonalities that appear to be characteristic for the European nation states approach 
to strategy were  
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• the increased national interest in strategic theory after wars; 
• the desire of many military strategists to reduce the complexity of strategy-
making through the prescription of clear and simple strategic principles; 
• the decisive contribution of scholars to the scientific reconstruction of military 
history and to the development of strategic theory; 
• the neglect of the multidimensionality of strategy in order to concentrate 
exclusively on those dimensions that are perceived as most critical.  
 
Differences among Britain, France, and Germany existed  
• in the realm of civil-military relations, particularly with regard to the 
institutional implementation of the primacy of policies; 
• the recognition of strategy or operations and tactics as points of main 
emphasis; 
• in the scientific cultures  philosophy or empiricism - as the intellectual 
environment for the development of strategic theories. 
 
Asking for reasons of commonalities and diversities, this study succeeded in 
revealing several common and specific elements of the national strategic cultures. The 
interpretation and making of strategic theory was influenced by 
• the geopolitical situation; 
• the changing balance-of-power relationship between Britain, France, and 
Germany; 
• the quality of military education in the realm of strategy; 
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• the intention to develop alternative strategic concepts. 
 
Even commanders of the armed forces quite often misunderstood Clausewitzs 
theoretical writing. Most of them just wanted to use his authority as justification for their 
solutions of strategic problems.337 In general, military commanders were not willing to 
reflect upon their own strategic predispositions critically, which implies to confront 
national strategy-making with Clausewitzs comprehensive theory of war and strategy. 
Consequently, national strategies often did not meet the complexity of the current 
strategic situation.  
Seen from this background, the contribution of scientists and scholars to strategy-
making in general and the Clausewitz interpretation in particular is of utmost importance. 
As Wallace argues, ... it is one thing to hold Clausewitz in high esteem and to idolize 
him, but a different thing to study him intellectually and intelligently, to try to penetrate 
into the depth of his thoughts and to digest and absorb his ideas.338 Scholars possess the 
proper education to understand Clausewitzs theoretical writings, in particular, and 
strategy in general, in the scientific manner Clausewitz applies. Furthermore, scholars are 
less eager to gain practical - and that often implies simple and fast - solutions from 
scientific strategic thinking.  
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Without question, On War offers many opportunities for misunderstandings, as 
Bassdorf highlights.339 However, Clausewitz is not responsible for these 
misunderstandings. He implies a scientific way of thinking that he assumes as appropriate 
to meet the complexity of war. The Prussian philosopher of war, actually, anticipated that 
his writings would be misunderstood in many different ways. However, that the quality 
of the strategic education would, at least in Germany, decline that dramatically, was not 
foreseeable, and definitely not the intention of Clausewitz and his Prussian co-reformers. 
Consequently, strategic education of politicians, officers and officials must emphasize the 
scientific approach to deal with complex strategic issues. 
In spite of all historical differences elaborated in this study, it remains very 
promising that a basic consensus exists between Clausewitz and those British strategic 
theorists who had intended to establish a different, even anti-Clausewitzian way of 
strategy-making. Indeed, as this study shows, the special British way of war and strategy 
can be easily integrated into Clausewitzs more comprehensive theory. By this, however, 
the limitations of the British way become apparent. 
Ironically, in spite of the catastrophes of World War I and World War II, there is a 
European tradition that strategic theorists intend to limit war. As Luvaas argues, Jomini 
probably spoke for most professional soldiers when he confessed that as a military man 
he preferred loyal and chivalric war to organized assassination, which may help to 
explain why he focused his attention on the more traditional aspects of the art of war  
strategy, grand tactics, and logistics.340 Liddell Hart, in this respect, stays within the 
Jominian Weltanschauung. The British theorists indirect approach even aims, 
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ideally, to prevent battle. The true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic 
situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its 
continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this.341 Also Clausewitz developed the 
concept of limited war. Actually, he pursues the same aim as Jomini and Liddell Hart do. 
However, he chooses a different way. Instead of prescribing strategic principles that serve 
limited warfare but do not meet the complexity of war, Clausewitz intends to make 
politicians and commanders aware of the dangerous nature of war. As Messelken argues, 
Such an policy which intends to prevent war with the highest efforts, should be based on 
a science trying to understand with the highest seriousness how wars really are.342 Thus, 
the Prussian philosopher of war encourages politicians, officers, and officials to acquire a 
broad knowledge about real war and strategy as multidimensional phenomena. And, he 
placed enormous responsibility on the shoulders of officers, commanders in particular, to 
cooperate with politicians and officials. 
Many of the reasons causing different interpretations of Clausewitzs theoretical 
writings as well as different strategy-making concepts do not exist anymore in todays 
EU. Germany has established the necessary institutions and educational facilities to 
ensure the primacy of policy. Geopolitical differences and balance-of-power policies are, 
as Clausewitz would argue, still an underlying reality in European inter-governmental 
relations. However, they are arched over by a collective security architecture that has 
provided not only gains for all European states but also contributed to a European 
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socialization. In the end, even cultural differences, for example in the field of science, can 
be overcome through international education.  
To conclude, Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy can serve as a common 
European paradigm on strategy. Even if the development of a strategic paradigm is very 
likely to take time, the explanation of differences, the abolishment of misperceptions, and 
the reconciliation of strategic theories might help politicians, officials and officers to 
establish an improved communication and cooperation in developing common European 
military strategies. 
 
In the next chapter, Clausewitzs theory of war will be applied to main strategic 
challenges of the future EU military forces. First of all, the strategic environment of the 
EU forces needs to be investigated. Then, a strategic challenge will be examined in more 











IV. CLAUSEWITZ AND THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE EU 
 
Chapter III supports the thesis main argument that Clausewitzs theory of war 
can be used as a common strategic paradigm for a future EU military strategy. Chapter IV 
intends to test the usefulness of Clausewitzs theory in assessing the strategic 
environment of the EU. Within this chapter, main propositions of Clausewitzs theory are 
used to analyze, first, the political process that finally led to the establishment of a CSDP 
and EU military forces, and secondly, the multinationality as a strategic principle of EU 
military operations. Again, Clausewitzs theory of war proves its usefulness, specifically 
by providing awareness of areas of strategic concerns and challenges. Providing a short 
reconstruction of the process that led to the establishment of EU military forces, and a 
strategic evaluation of the decisions made so far facilitates the understanding of this 
chapter.  
 
A. THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT  
Since the end of the Cold War, strategic discussions beyond the nuclear level have 
regained importance in Europe. This is particularly true for Britain, France, and Germany 
as the major military powers in Europe. Being member states of NATO, these countries 
participated profoundly in the development of the new NATO Strategic Concepts that 
were endorsed in 1991 and 1999343. At the same time, these countries have conducted 
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105
internal discussions about national security strategy, and about their interests, objectives, 
assumptions, means, and restraints. However, the content, intensity, and results of these 
still ongoing debates have been quite different. Britain and France developed national 
strategies that favor multinational cooperation but emphasize the capability to act 
independently. By contrast, Germany, which during the Cold War had transferred 
strategic decision-making authority entirely to NATO, emphasized multinational 
responsibilities and the necessity to exclusively decide upon and conduct military 
operations multilaterally.344 In spite of these differences, all European states were forced 
to reform their military forces.345  
 
1. Britains and Frances Strategic Initiative  
 
France and Britain have dominated the strategic debate in Europe. In November 
1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair and president Jacques Chirac surprised NATO allies 
and EU partners with a Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit in Saint-
Malo, France. Proclaiming that the European Union needs to be in a position to play its 
full role on the international stage... Blair and Chirac requested the EUs ...capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
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them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.346 This 
initiative and its further development in several EU summits347 have decisively 
influenced the strategic situation in Europe.  
At the Helsinki European Council (EC) in December 1999, agreement was 
achieved on the following:  
Co-operating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be 
able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year 
military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks. New political and military bodies and structures will be 
established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary 
political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while 
respecting the single institutional framework. (...) A Non-military crisis 
management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more 
effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the 
military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.348 
 
With regard to strategy and force planning, the EC announced the necessity to 
improve some key military capabilities: among these the establishment of a European air 
transport command, the enhancement of strategic sealift capacity, the coordination of 
monitoring and early warning military means.349 With regard to NATO, the EC 
emphasized that the creation of the CSDP and the European Rapid Reaction Forces 
(ERRF) does not intend to undermine the transatlantic links. 
                                                 
 
345 More details in Unterseher, Europe`s Armed Forces at the Millenium. 
346 Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, 
available (online): http://www.fco.gov.uk.news/newstext.asp?1795, p.1 (02.02.01). 
347 The ESDP process was continued at the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, at the WEU 
Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg, November 1999, and during the UK-French Summit some days 
later, where the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Corps was proposed. 
348 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, quoted in Oakes, 
European Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, p. 32. A smaller rapid reaction element is announced 
to possess an even higher operational readiness.  
349 Oakes, European Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, pp. 32- 33. 
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The discussion- and decision-making process from St. Malo to Nice displays 
several characteristics of the European strategy-making: 
1) Britain and France have taken over the leadership in promoting the ESDP. 
Consequently, Britain and France will provide leadership in the strategy making 
process. 
2) Both, Britain and France, have changed their traditional positions significantly. 
Britain that already had committed itself with the British Army of the Rhein during 
the Cold War period, has not revitalized its traditional reluctance to get militarily 
involved in continental affairs; France committed itself not to instrumentalize the EU 
in order to undermine the transatlantic partnership with the US in NATO.  
3) The military forces of the EU must be capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, 
including peace-making operations. The initial military strength, however, is 
sufficient only for achieving very limited political and military aims. To meet the 
risks of escalation and failure that Clausewitz emphasizes so strongly, the ERRF 
needs to be reinforced, either by national means of the EU member states or by 
NATO, in especially by the US. Due to different, mainly financial, restraints, the 
reliance of the EU on NATO in any major military scenario will remain even in the 
long perspective. Consequently, the EU has announced it will conduct military 
operations only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Even for these cases, the EU 
plans to provide full consultation and transparency with NATO.  
4) EU forces are to move to the crisis region instead of waiting until the crisis comes to 
the EU member states territories. Consequently, the EU military strategy is offensive 
and proactive, containing all the advantages and disadvantages of offensive-proactive 
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action on a strategic level. To prevent escalation of crisis situations and even major 
war scenarios, the deployment of EU forces is to be conducted as early as possible. 
This requires not only a high operational readiness of forces but also a speedy 
strategic decision-making process on the involved inter-governmental and national 
political and military levels. Therefore, the EU military strategy cannot rely on the 
indirect approach of waiting until favorable conditions have been achieved.  
5) The political decision-making process on the use of EU military forces is located 
within the European Council. A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
provides the necessary political strategic direction. The Military Committee (MC), 
comprising the national Chiefs of Defense, gives military advice. The MC has to 
submit military direction to the Military Staff (MS) that include representatives of all 
branches of the member states armed forces. Finally, the MC is responsible for 
strategic planning, including the identification of European national and multinational 
forces. Thus, the primacy of policies and close civil-military cooperation are ensured 
institutionally. 
6) The EU strategy is based on a broad security understanding. This comprises not only 
economic means but also, for example, police forces assigned to the EU. In general, 
also on the strategic level, close cooperation with civilian agencies (IOs and NGOs) 
will be established through a non-military crisis management element350 that works in 
parallel to the military staff.  
                                                 
350 See also Solana, Speech at the Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin, 17 December 1999 , 
available (online): http://ue.eu.int/newsroom: (March 2001) We have established an action plan to 
ensure that we are able to respond rapidly and more effectively with non-military tools to emerging 
crisis situations. According to Voigt, a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management has 
been established. It has set up a database on civilian police and is now compiling data on rule of law-
experts. .... by 2003 the EU wants to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers crisis management 
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7) The EU strategy is peace-oriented. Military engagements, in particular wars, should 
be avoided by other means. Generally, military engagements are to be conducted in 
such a way that the requirements of the future peace building process in the area of 
operations are always regarded. 
8) The military area of operations has enlarged up to 3000 miles outside the EU 
territory. Thus, military operations must be joint operations requiring strategic 
logistics with extended (Sea) Lines of Communication.  
9) Multinationality is a strategic principle. This demands efforts to ... adapt, exercise 
and bring together national and multinational European forces351, including the 
opening of existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other 
nations.352 
 
2. Reasons of the Paradigmatic Shift 
 
A very short look at the history of British-French relations highlights that the St. 
Malo Declaration marks a paradigmatic shift in strategic thinking. In general, the history 
of British-French relations had been a history of war, conflict, and competition, not only 
in Europe but in colonial affairs as well. Facing Germany as a common threat, Britain 
and France started forms of military cooperation in 1894. However, actual cooperation in 
                                                 
 
operations, among them 1,000 officers within 30 days (Voigt, The discussion on ESDP as Part of the 
Birth Pangs of a New Atlanticism, Address at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 14.02.01, p. 
7-8). 
351 Annex III of Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999, quoted in Oakes, 
European Defense: From Pörtschach to Helsinki, p. 24. 
352 The opening of national joint headquarters is necessary because multinational joint headquarters 
outside NATO do not exist. EU military operations can be conducted by British, French or even 
German national headquarters, enlarged by delegations or representatives of the force contributing 
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World War I and World War II remained very poor. Instead, it was the US, that Britain 
cooperated with very closely.353 Even after World War II, in NATO, Britain and France 
pursued different policies. Britain continued its special relationship with the US, while 
France remained skeptical about the US influence in Europe. Finally, after fierce disputes 
about strategic questions, France under President de Gaulle finally left the integrated 
structure of NATO. With Britain closely linked to the US policy in and for Europe, and 
Germany trying to avoid taking any firm position in the disputes, France appeared to be 
the only nation that actually represented European interests. France pursuit these interests 
through leadership within the EU (former ECCS, EC). When Britain, mainly due to 
economic reasons, intended to become a member state of the EC, it was French President 
de Gaulle in 1963 that said no. In the end, it took Britain until 1973 to gain access to 
the EC.  
As in NATO, Britain and France generally pursued different positions in the EU 
(EC).354 One example is the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Britain 
supported the WEU and NATO as institutions to strengthen ESDI while France intended 
to merge the WEU with the EU and to develop an ESDP rather independently from 
NATO. And while Britain participated in those multinational formations that were 
triggered by NATO (ARRC; MND C), France got engaged in the Eurocorps as the 
military hallmark of the European integration process.   
From Britain, the St. Malo Declaration demanded a more radical shift than from 
France. First of all, Britain traditionally maintained the role as balancer for continental 
                                                 
 
nations. 
353 Parker, R.A.C., The Second World War, Oxford/New York, 1997, pp. 115-130. 
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Europe, fighting against those states that tried to disturb the balance of power. Secondly, 
the traditional British strategy of indirect approach refused any long-lasting 
commitments in continental affairs. After the catastrophe of the Great War, Liddell Hart 
... claimed that Britains successful past strategy (which had been ignored in 1914-18) 
was to avoid continental commitments, making full use of the flexibility of the sea power 
and of land forces at exposed weak points, leaving the waging of continental war to 
Britains allies.355  
In fact, several very important reasons stimulated Britain and France to conduct 
this paradigmatic shift. The strong position of the defense industry in Britain356 and 
France (state level) and the leadership attitudes of Tony Blair357, particularly, (individual 
level) are relevant but not sufficient reasons. Those reasons have the most weight that are 
closely tight to Clausewitzs propositions of the power-of-balance mechanism, and of the 
necessity to match ends and means in strategy-making:  
• (1) After the end of the Cold War the development of the overall balance of power in 
Europe (system level) caused a loss of relative power for Britain and France.  
                                                 
 
354 Young, Hugo, This Blessed Plot, Woodstock/New York: The Overlook Press, 1998. 
355 Quoted in Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p. 180. 
356 The building of the British empire provides a reasonable explanation for the strong position of the 
British defense industry. During the period of conquest and annexation that shaped the British Empire, 
a state was established that ... was organized to facilitate expansion, and it pursued a consistent 
commercial and military strategy to achieve it. The state as a military organization, and an apparatus of 
force and coercion, looms large in this account, and therefore also the importance of the industrial-
military complex which has sustained it  particularly the naval shipyards from the seventeenth century 
onwards, and more recently the aerospace industry (Gamble, Andrew, State, Economy and Society, 
in Ian Holliday, Andrew Gamble & Geraint Parry (ed.), Fundamentals in British Politics, New York: 
St. Martins Press, 1999, p. 37). 
357 Young, This Blessed Plot, p. 485. 
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• (2) The mismatch between strategic objectives and available military means of 
Britain and France forced them to cooperate and, furthermore, to lead the ESDP, or to 
downgrade their national interests and multinational responsibilities. 
 
(1) In the Cold War period, Britains power position as a great power in Europe 
was mainly based on its military capabilities (that include power projection capabilities 
and nuclear weapons), and on the special relationship with the US. However, Britains 
late membership in the then EC and, in the case of the Monetary Union, limited 
participation in EU projects have reduced its relative power position compared with 
France and Germany, in particular in the field of economics. With the EU enlargement to 
East Europe, Britain is likely to continue to lose relative power, in particular compared 
with Germany. The integration of Britains economy into the NAFTA, proposed as a 
logical consequence of the special relationship with the US358, has barely found serious 
attraction. 
In the field of military cooperation, Britain has become disconnected from the 
European trend to establish multinational military formations. While Britain attached all 
major army formations to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps of NATO, Germany has 
emerged as the European state with the most influence in all other multinational 
formations (Eurocorps, I. (GE/NL) Corps, II. (GE/US) Corps, V. (US/GE) Corps, MNC 
NE). The Netherlands army, which traditionally maintained close links to the British 
army, has been almost entirely integrated into the I. (GE/NL) Corps. Up to now, this 
Corps has achieved its greatest success in deep integration, comprising common 
                                                 
358 Black, Conrad, Britains Atlantic Option, in The National Interest, Spring 1999, p. 20. 
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funding, administration, and integrated logistics. As a consequence of this success, the 
government of the Netherlands decided to transfer money to the German Ministry of 
Defense (not to the British) to contribute in the strategic airlift program of the 
Bundeswehr.359 
To improve its relative power position in Europe, Britain assessed the ESDP as 
the proper place for political and military engagement. In the 90s, the role as the leader or 
co-leader in the European security and defense issue appeared to be vacant due to 
Germanys reluctance to gain power through military engagement. Furthermore, Britain 
traditionally was widely expected to be a profound leader in military issues.360  
In the Cold War period, Frances position as a great power was mainly based on 
its military capabilities (that include power projection capabilities and nuclear weapons), 
and on its leading role in the European integration process. However, with Germanys 
unification and the envisioned eastern enlargement of the EU, France is likely to lose 
relative power, compared to Germany. The traditionally tense relationship with the US 
has been favorable for the reputation of France as an independent great power; however, 
this has led to the self-exclusion of France from the decision-making process of NATOs 
integrated military structure. With Germany possessing the economic leading role, France 
needed to reinforce its proclaimed dominant role in the EU, first by establishing a new 
field of leadership, secondly by looking for a powerful partner. Consequently, France has 
taken over the co-leadership in the CSDP with Britain. Additionally, with the Eurocorps 
as assigned headquarter to command KFOR, France has signaled its willingness to 
                                                 
359 NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report AT-247-DSC-00-7, pp. 13-15; available (online): 
http:/www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/2000/at-247-e.html (27.11.00).   
360 See Gamble, State, Economy and Society, p. 37: Britain is regarded as a significant military 
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cooperate closely with NATO and the US. Finally, all these activities are in line with the 
overall French policy to decrease the political and military influence of the US in Europe 
and to confine the power of Germany.  
In the end, as Clausewitz would argue, the traditional balance-of-power 
mechanism worked again in the old fashioned way. The united Germany in post-Cold 
War Europe has changed the balance-of-power in the EU. Consequently, Britain and 
France have been forced to react. Germany, realizing the concerns of Britain and France, 
has acted very cautiously this time. By reducing its military forces more rapidly than 
Britain and France, Germany signaled that it was not interested in expanding its already 
gained advantages in relative power by taking over the lead in the military integration of 
Europe.  
 
(2) Both states, Britain and France, have been following the same strategy: power 
projection is in the center of their current military strategic concepts. This is primarily for 
three reasons: First, power projection capabilities are necessary to conduct military 
operations offensively and proactively. Second, the reduction of oversea-stationed troops 
has made a stronger reliance on power projection capabilities inevitable. And third, the 
possession of power projection capabilities is supposed to enhance the international 
reputation as great powers. 
However, a closer look at the currently available military means and the future 
force planning goals reveals that neither Britain nor France are likely to possess the 
required means to sustain a power projection strategy. Some examples illustrate this 
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argument: First, the availability of one or two aircraft carriers is not sufficient for 
permanent power projection. The US Navy has a rule-of-thumb that five carriers are 
needed to keep one routinely on station at all times.361 Second, joint operations require 
the establishment of mobile headquarters at corps level. However, neither Britain nor 
France is able to maintain this level of command and control in extended operations. 
Third, the duration of SFOR-/KFOR-type military operations (both are supposed to last 
for several years if not decades) has not been properly reflected in the force-planning 
goals.362 The British army, in particular, is over-committed. Confronted with the 
mismatch of goals and means, the British and French governments had to decide between 
two courses of action: to downgrade national interests and multinational responsibilities 
or to cooperate with the only other European nation that is capable of projecting power.  
Several reasons exist why the downsizing of national interests and multinational 
responsibilities offer no political solution for Britain and France. First, peacekeeping 
operations in Europe are expected to prevent higher costs that possibly inflicted by large 
refugee flows or destabilization of entire regions. Secondly, they are expected to 
contribute to the implementation of a Europe that is united, and free. Third, social 
democratic and liberal governments put more emphasis on the protection of human rights 
in their foreign and security policies.363 And fourth, taking over multinational 
responsibility is favorable for the states reputation. 
However, a purely British-French cooperation would again have to be confronted 
with the mismatch of goals and means, in particular in sustaining military operations. If 
                                                 
361 Unterseher, Europe`s Armed Forces at the Millenium, p. 15. 
362 Unterseher, Europe`s Armed Forces at the Millenium, pp. 16-18 and 28-29. 
363 Howard, Michael, War and the liberal Conscience, Cambridge, 1977. 
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Britain and France conduct power projection operations with an early deployment of 
forces, these forces are likely to become committed for a long time. Therefore, Britain 
and France may run out of forces, if new crisis situations emerge. Consequently, British-
French cooperation must be reinforced by other European nations. Then, British and 
French forces can be deployed proactively, while all other forces, due to less power 
projection capabilities or political reasons, serve mainly to reinforce and to sustain 
already ongoing military operations. This kind of burden-sharing would definitely 
maintain the British and French leadership in the ESDP.  
However, being aware made by Clausewitz that crisis situations can escalate to 
wars, EU strategists, at least for the foreseeable future, have to rely on the military 
capabilities of NATO. Consequently, EU strategy must establish institutional links with 




Multinationality in military operations has been a hallmark of European military 
affairs from the antiquity to World War II.364 From Clausewitzs point of view, coalitions 
in Europe have had one major reason: whenever states try to gain hegemony over the 
other states, the latter build a coalition to re-establish the traditional balance-of-power.  
                                                 
364 Historic examples are listed in Klein, Paul, Probleme in multinationalen militärischen Verbänden 
am Beispiel der Deutsch-Französischen Brigade, SOWI-Arbeitspapier Nr. 83, München, September 
1993. Modern multinationality is broadly discussed in Rasmussen, Ingrid: NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, committee Reports, Defense and security. Draft special report: Multinationality in crisis 
response operations, 22.09.2000, available (online): www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/2000/at-
244-e.html (March 2001). 
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The process of the multinationalizing military structures and operations365 in the 
90s can be traced back to several reasons. Governments and military commanders have 
argued that multinationality  
• serves as a justification of stopping further reductions of the armed forces, as 
demanded by large groups in civil society as a kind of peace dividend after 
the end of the Cold War;  
• is necessary to maintain the corps level that is required to command joint 
operations366;  
• improves burden sharing among allied nations;  
• increases military efficiency and flexibility; 




                                                 
365 In the 90s, six multinational corps have been established in Europe, and several multinational 
operations have been conducted. A closer look at the multinational corps reveals that they are not 
always structured in the same way. All have multinational staffs that already exist in peace times. 
However, the staffs are organized in different ways. While the ARRC and the two GE-US corps follow 
the lead nation-principle, the other corps have integrated staffs: all nations involved provide the same 
amount of resources to make the headquarters operational. Only one multinational corps is actually 
commanding subordinated divisions and divisional troops in peacetime: that is the I. GE/NL Corps. 
Additionally, the I. GE/NL Corps is the only multinational corps that pursues deep integration. Since 
the mid-90s, NATO and WEU conducted several multinational operations. SFOR in Bosnia, for 
example, used to have three multinational divisions, organized in accordance with the lead nation
principle. Multinationality within SFOR has not only been practiced at SFOR headquarters or 
divisional headquarters level, but also at brigade, battalion and company level, and even in smaller 
units, like police guards. 
366 Not only smaller countries but also Britain did not possess sufficient forces to maintain national 
corps headquarters. Therefore, Britain volunteered to staff the ARRC as lead nation. Thus, Britain can 
keep influence within military formations just below the command level of the integrated structure that 
actually accomplish military operations, maintain the expertise of conducting military operations at the 
tactical level where joint operations actually can be launched, and keep forces in reunited Germany as 
a stabilizing and reassuring factor. 
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1. The Dark Side: Crises 
 
The history of NATO shows that, beyond several advantages of multinationality, 
crises are characteristic for alliances. In common understanding, crises are expected to be 
negative, to be something that should be avoided. However, as existential philosophy 
shows367, crises might strengthen the capabilities of individuals, organizations, and even 
states to deal with the challenges of their existence. Without a doubt, a sound 
philosophical deduction would not conclude that crisis situations should be triggered 
intentionally. Crises, for sure, are dangerous. However, once a crisis is on the way, 
individuals, organizations, and states can try to overcome a crisis in a way that 
strengthens their capabilities. 
Some organizations are more susceptible to crises than others. In general, 
multinationality is one reason for a higher degree of crisis susceptibility. With regard to 
defense and security organizations, Clausewitzs theory of war provides a useful 
explanation for this phenomenon. Clausewitz argues that war is the continuation of 
policies and politics with other means.368 This proposition includes the government, the 
people, and the commander (with the military forces subordinated to him) as major 
actors. Generally, these actors create a specific interrelationship. First of all, even during 
war, the political intercourse between people and their governments is continued.369 This 
is, especially, true for democracies that have established democratic cultures 
                                                 
367 Bollnow, Otto F., Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1984. 
368 Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.  
369 Clausewitz, On War, p. 605. 
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encompassing civil societies.370 Secondly, the commander of the military forces is 
subordinated to the political government. Again, this is one of the most important 
hallmarks of democratic political systems, although the experience of the two most 
developed democracies, the US and Britain, exemplifies that this relationship is subject to 
permanent disputes and conflicts371. In general, relations in terms of power and interests 
can change between the people, the government, and the commander with his military 
forces.  
Alliances and coalitions integrate and, thus, duplicate the fascinating trinity372 
of government, people and commander (with the subordinated military forces) in 
accordance with the number of states involved. Therefore, with several independent 
actors involved in multinational decision-making and implementation of strategies, 
command and control appears to be rather limited, while complexity and friction tend to 
be unlimited. Consequently, military alliances and coalitions face stronger problems of 
achieving consensus in strategy-making than purely national systems. In general, they are 
more susceptible to crises; the high number of political actors involved in political-
military strategy-making and its operational-tactical implementation increases the 
probability that national interests and political objectives are different. 
Multinationality definitely increases complexity and friction. By this, additional 
complexity and friction is added to the already high amount of complexity and friction 
that characterizes war. War, as Clausewitz stated very clearly, is the realm of danger, of 
                                                 
370 See Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy toward Consolidation, Baltimore and London, 1999, 
pp. 161-260. 
371 Strachan, The Politics of the British Army; Hogan, A Cross of Iron.
372 Clausewitz, On War, p. 89. 
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exhaustion, of lack of information, and, nota bene, of the independent action of the 
enemy (and the neutral countries).373 In alliances, it is not only the nature of war and the 
independent will of the enemy that causes complexity and friction but also the 
unpredictability of the political and military action of the allies. Consequently, at least in 
theory, complexity and friction have a tendency to the extreme if the opponent parties are 
both alliances comprising democratic member states. 
Clausewitz is very realistic about the reasons why states become involved in 
military alliances and why the states' contributions to the alliances goal are often rather 
limited. Maintaining national command and control about their force contributions to 
alliances, states remain capable of pursuing national policies  that include the 
opportunity to even withdraw their military contingents from the theatre of operations. 
Furthermore, as Clausewitz recovered from military history, 
... even when both states (of the alliance; U.H.) are in earnest about 
making war upon the third, they do not always say, we must treat this 
country as our common enemy and destroy it, or we shall be destroyed 
ourselves. Far from it: the affair is more often like a business deal. In the 
light of the risks he expects and the dividend he hopes for, each will invest 
about 30,000 to 40,000 men, and behave as if that were all he stood to 
lose.374  
 
This business-type involvement of nations in alliances is prevalent in those cases 
where the threat of opponent forces is more limited. Consequently, different national 
interests and political objectives of member states of alliances might cause that ... 
interaction, the effort to outdo the enemy, the violent and compulsive course of war, all 
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stagnate for lack of real incentive.375 Consequently, complexity and friction within 
alliances can be higher in cases of limited warfare than in cases of rather unlimited 
warfare. 
Finally, recognizing that multinational strategy-making is, like warfare, a ... 
movement in a resistant element376, one can conclude that crises in alliances are quite 
normal affairs. Consequently, the main emphasis should be put on the question of how to 
prevent negative impacts of crises on the alliances ends and means and how to take 
advantage of the crises to increase its reliability and efficiency. 
 
2. Lesson Learned from NATO Crises  
 
NATO may serve as an excellent lesson learned for the EU. What were the 
common elements of NATO crises? Clausewitz, by describing war as a fascinating 
trinity, provides the theoretical framework for analyzing and assessing NATO crises. 
The most important reason for crises appears to be the national policies and politics that 
the governments of member states pursue within NATO. Multinational strategies (of 
warfare, or crisis management, or deterrence, or detente) are always a  more or less 
dominant377 - reflection of domestic policies and politics.378 The behavior and political 
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376 Clausewitz, On War, p. 120. 
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action of specific states within the alliance can only be understood if this domestic 
political intercourse is considered. Consequently, an alliance can only act successfully, if 
the alliances aims and political and military decision-making institutions are sufficiently 
flexible to meet the essential requirements of single member states domestic policies and 
politics.  
A second important reason, which all NATO crises have in common, is that 
mutual trust between the allies was not sufficient to overcome emerging skepticism about 
the political and military reliability of specific fellow allies, in particular the leading 
nation. The significance of mutual trust as a reason to explain NATO crises is based on 
the theoretical proposition that, in general, trust is necessary to reduce complexity. 
Consequently, if states are in doubt about the willingness of allies to agree on a common 
policy and to provide the necessary means to accomplish this policy, crises are inevitably 
the result. 
The third reason is closely connected to the second one. In alliances comprising 
nations of unequal political and military strength, leadership is necessary. This is 
especially true for alliances in which decision-making is based on the consensus 
principle. Consequently, leadership is connected with specific attributes the member 
states of the alliance expect from the leadership nation. However, these expectations 





a. The Policies and Politics of NATOs Member States 
In international crises and wars that threaten the political independence 
and even existence of states and societies, all member states of alliances have the 
tendency to agree on strategies of rather unlimited warfare and are willing to provide the 
means necessary to implement this strategy. However, disagreement might occur about 
the implementation of the agreed strategy in specific situations, about common action in 
situations not covered by the strategy, about the use of specific means, and, in a 
paradigmatic change of the security environment, about the structure and elements of a 
new strategy. All these disagreements are connected with different national policies and 
politics and have the potential to trigger crises within an alliance. This has been also true 
for NATO. 
Assessing the Soviet Union military capabilities as an existential threat, all 
NATO members were willing to take the measures deemed necessary and remaining 
within the restrictions imposed, particularly, by the national economy379. Within NATO, 
the fundamental difference between the US and the European states was the latters loss 
of independence in security policy. As Jordan argues, The Europeans accepted the 
strategy (of MC/48). In so doing, they were transferring to the American president, and in 
some cases even to the American military commanders, the power to start a war  a 
power which in extreme cases might have to be exercised without even consulting 
                                                 
379 The limitations imposed by the economy, in particular, were recognized in NATOs strategic 
concepts. Although the US had significantly more assets available than all European NATO states 
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them380. Essentially, this remained true during the entire Cold War. The following 
discusses historic examples of the power mismatch within the alliance that caused friction 
and, finally, crises. 
For the Western Continental European states, in particular for Germany, 
the basic assumption of the first NATO strategic concepts (1949-1950) that NATO would 
be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe unless it immediately employed 
nuclear weapons was a matter of highest national concern. First of all, the use of nuclear 
weapons would have devastated the front states, Germany in particular. Secondly, 
gaining popular support381 for the increase of defense expenditures - in Germany for the 
rearmament - proved difficult, as long as these countries remained the target area of US 
nuclear weapons. Consequently, Germany, supported by others (for example, France), 
intended to shift the defense line as far east as possible. Heavily depending on the still 
incomplete German conventional forces to contribute to the alliances defense, NATO 
changed the subsequent strategic concepts. In the MC 14, forward defense as far east as 
possible was established as guidance.382 Thus, through alternation of the core element of 
the strategic concept, NATO prevented a crisis. However, the consequences for the 
strategic reliability of NATO were severe. NATO agreed to change the strategic concept 
into forward defense, although the necessary means to implement forward defense were 
                                                 
380 Jordan, Norstad, p. 88. See also p. 94.  During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, the 
European allies were not consulted. During the Kosovo war, the US also acted independently, without 
informing its allies. See Daalder\OHanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 124. 
381 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, p. 19; Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969. 
382 Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, p. IV: MC 14 instructed military planners 
in the Regional Planning Groups to develop plans aimed at holding the enemy as far to the east as 
possible, as far to the east and north as possible in Italy, and outside a defensible area in Northern 
Europe. See MC 14/1 on p. 212: The concept for the defense of Western Europe is to hold the enemy 
as far to the east in Germany as is feasible, using all offensive and defensive means available to deny 
or limit his freedom of action to the maximum extent. 
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not available (even in the near future). Apparently, rhetoric that had already used over-
simplification as a proper means to achieve acceptance of the NATO treaty and its 
expenditures383, was now applied to solve internal conflicts in military strategy-
making.384 
By contrast to Germany, when France challenged the nuclear strategy of 
NATO by insisting on gaining a specific role in the nuclear decision-making process 
(stationing and use of nuclear weapons), NATO did not change its policy. In the field of 
nuclear policies of NATO, the national interests of the US and France collided. Finally, 
the US was even willing to accept Frances defection from the integrated military 
structure although this implied a major revision of NATOs strategy. Without France, no 
close rear area was available neither for the stationing of nuclear weapons nor for the 
embarkation of follow-on-forces and supply. Even NATO headquarters would have been 
moved from French soil. In spite of these strategic disadvantages, the US was unwilling 
to reconcile its national position with the French one. Rigid US policy, enforced by a 
historic disinclination to France385, contributed to the latters incremental disintegration 
out of the military structure of NATO. In the end, a closer look at the propositions of the 
leading French theorists on nuclear strategy reveals that NATO even through institutional 
                                                 
383 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, p. 19. 
384 The negative influence of rhetoric on the making of strategy was repeated in the Kosovo war when 
NATO (with the US in lead) formulated political goals that were not in line with the strategic 
objectives and military means of NATO. For further information see Daalder/OHanlon, Winning 
Ugly, pp. 11, 101-136. 
385 Harper reconstructs the tense relationship between Roosevelt and de Gaulle (Harper, John L., 
American Visions of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 115-117). Jordan states that ... 
the US treated Britain and France differently in regard to nuclear affairs (Jordan, Norstad, p. 110). 
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changes or rhetoric means probably would not have been successful in preventing de 
Gaulle to defect.386 
From 1956 on, with the Soviet Unions parity in the field of 
intercontinental weapons, the US became worried about NATOs strategy of massive 
retaliation. Furthermore, lessons learned from crisis management in Berlin crises 
indicated what became evident during the Cuban missile crisis: sufficient conventional 
means387 must be available to solve military conflicts and to prevent limited conflicts 
from causing a devastating nuclear exchange. Therefore, the US administration under 
Kennedy pushed towards the development of a strategy that offered a flexible 
response388 to different military challenges. The continental Europeans, however, 
preferred to keep the strategy of massive retaliation. Their governments feared a de-
coupling of Europe from the US, in particular the danger of a war between the US and the 
Soviet Union (SU) that could be limited to Europe as theater of war389. Finally, the 
disputes about a new NATO strategy were solved in a way that, in the long run, 
strengthened NATO significantly. With the dismissal of de Gaulle and social democratic 
parties taking over government in several European countries, the strategy of flexible 
response was adopted and, initiated by the Europeans, enlarged by a dual track approach 
                                                 
386 The French strategy is briefly described in Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, pp. 80-81. 
387 See Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, pp. 69-70. 
388 Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, p. XII: For the Berlin Crisis, at least, 
flexible response was already a reality by 1962. See also p. XIV. 
389 This fear emerged at latest with the perceived vulnerability of the US territory caused by the 
Sputnik-shock. Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, p. XI. 
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of the Harmel-report that allowed the Europeans to take the initiative in the detente policy 
of NATO.390  
When the war in former Yugoslavia started, Europe was supposed to find 
a political-military solution. However, without the US, Europe was not able to 
successfully accomplish crisis management operations. Unfortunately, the US was 
reluctant to get involved militarily, particularly with ground forces. The use of air strikes, 
on the other side, would have endangered those European forces that were already 
deployed in Bosnia as elements of UNPROFOR or the British-Dutch-French Rapid 
Reaction Force.391 As a result of missing consensus within NATO, war and the tragedy 
of ethnical cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not stopped until the Dayton peace 
accord was signed in 1995. Before Dayton, NATO, already confronted with 
legitimization problems, was stuck in a crisis due to its inactivity, while the US looked 
weak392. This crisis was solved successfully when the Clinton administration, with 
sufficient support from the US congress, the American people, and the military 
commanders, decided to get involved diplomatically and militarily. One of the major 
reasons for the US administration to get involved militarily was that the existence of 
NATO was set in danger. With the successful conduct of the SFOR mission, NATO 
regained the credibility it had lost before393, and emerged in a strengthened form out of 
this crisis. 
                                                 
390 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, p. 90. Thomas points out that with the outlook of improved 
East-West relations, relations within NATO became restrained (p. 108).  
391 More detailed information and other examples of the divergent European and US interests are 
analyzed in Daalder, Getting to Dayton, pp. 5-45. 
392 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 101. 
393 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 164. 
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Several years later, in 1998, a similar scenario occurred in Kosovo. Again, 
the US administration was reluctant to get involved. From the US point of view, no vital 
national interests were threatened that justified the deployment of ground forces and any 
military action that might cause casualties.394 Consequently, support of the Congress and 
the US people was unlikely. In 1999, when the US administration finally decided to take 
diplomatic and military action through NATO, the political restraints of the Kosovo war 
and its way of warfare nearly led to a defeat of NATO. Analyzing the Kosovo war, the 
European nations, in particular Britain and France, realized that a strategy of preventive 
military action that includes early deployment of military forces for crisis management is 
unlikely with a US that is more focused on national interests. In the end, rather the 
reluctance of the US to become too involved in peace-keeping and peace-making 
operations than the technology gap between the US and its European allies led to the St. 
Malo declaration of Britain and France that triggered the creation of autonomous Rapid 
Reaction Forces of the EU. 
In its history, NATO was able to solve most of the crises that were 
initiated by governments of single member states. The governments NATO policies are 
based on national interests and influenced by the people they represent, by the political 
parties they depend on, and by the academic discussion influencing the political opinions 
of politicians and people. In the end, as Thomas puts it, The nature of the enemy (the 
SU; U.H.) was involved as a pretext for unity and conformity, but this did not change the 
fact that Europeans and Americans had different interests in important issues, ranging 
                                                 
394 Daalder/OHanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 97, 130-136. 
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from intervention in Vietnam to the formulation of nuclear strategy.395 Crises 
strengthened NATO as long as NATO was able to agree on new institutional 
arrangements, or at least on rhetoric that reconciled different national positions 
superficially. However, the defection of France constituted a European independence 
from the US that, after the experience in the Balkans, has found an institutional 
expression outside NATO: that is the EU establishing military forces of its own. By this, 
the European policy of decreasing independence from the US that started in the fields of 
nuclear weapons and gained its first major success with the dual track approach of the 
NATO strategic concept MC 14/3 was also applied in the field of peace support 
operations.  
 
b. Reduction of Complexity and Uncertainty through Trust and 
Leadership 
The major social function of trust is the reduction of complexity.396 
Nation states have to create trust among their people, especially when confronted with a 
powerful opponent or with uncertainties about future threats. The necessity of trust 
applies also for alliances, specifically in order to ease cooperation among the member 
states, and between NATO commanders and national leaders. In NATO, rhetoric means 
have been used for this purpose.397 In the end, rhetoric has even proven to be helpful in 
                                                 
395 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, p. 84. 
396 Luhmann, Niklas, Trust and Power, Chichester/New York/Brisbane/Toronto, 1979, pp. 24-31. 
397 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, elaborates the function of rhetoric for the NATO alliance. An 
excellent example is the rhetoric of common values to transform NATO into an agent of change in 
order to counter the Gorbachev challenge (pp. 146-147). 
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finding common solutions for new challenges. However, trust needs to stand tests in the 
reality of political action.  
NATO SACEUR General Norstad serves as an excellent example to 
illustrate the importance of personalities creating and enhancing trust in alliances  
expressed by the people and, in particular, by the political leaders of the member 
states.398 First of all, and nearly independent from his personal attitudes, Norstad, being 
an Air Force general, embodied the technological way of war most people were 
convinced of and attracted by. Besides this, Norstad and his military records399 
represented the viability of the current NATO strategic concept of massive retaliation. 
Norstad himself supported his positive public image by offensive media activities.400 As 
long as the NATO strategy of massive retaliation remained valid, Norstad was the right 
person to be SACEUR. With the Kennedy administration and the shift to the strategy of 
flexible response, Norstads time as SACEUR was over  not only in order to ease the 
cooperation with the new US administration but also as a sign sent to the allies that the 
alteration of NATOs strategic concept was its strong determination. 
Practicing a multi-dimensional approach, Norstad succeeded in 
establishing trustful relations with the governments of the European NATO member 
states. He clearly recognized that alliance leadership demands a very deep understanding 
of the constituent governments, their policies, their basic motivation, and their political 
                                                 
398 For this reason, general Eisenhower became SACEUR in 1951 when the threat of war was 
perceived as extremely high because of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. See Jordan, 
Norstad, p. 80. 
399 Jordan, Norstad, pp. 21-95. 
400 Examples of Norstads media coverage are in Jordan, Norstad, pp. 78-79.  
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strength.401 However, sometimes the results of his personal ability to create trustful 
relations were destroyed by institutional restraints. Possessing a double-hatted position, 
Norstad was not only NATO commander but also subject to the US government. Norstad 
realized that this national dependence created a dilemma for him (as well as for all 
multinational commanders of NATO): Most of the problem came from the fact that too 
often they expected me to be the one who would carry out an American decision 
independently of the NATO countries.402 With the US administration forcing him only 
to reflect but not to advocate the positions of the European allies, Norstad finally was not 
always able to prove trustworthy when it was necessary to prevent NATO crises.403 
However, NATO finally succeeded in establishing the position of 
Secretary-General as the one that is even more important for the establishment of trust 
between the member states. Being a politician, the Secretary-General can act more 
independently from the national chain of command than a military officer with a double 
hat. Furthermore, the Secretary-General is tasked to work for the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) as the political decision-making body of NATO offering all member states equal 
representation. Consequently, the Secretary General possesses the opportunity to initiate 
political discussions that are based more on arguing and multinational responsibilities 
than on national interests.  
                                                 
401 ONeil, Robert, Foreword, in Jordan, Norstad, p. XIII. 
402 General Norstad, as quoted in Jordan, Norstad, p. 9. See also p. 4. 
403 One famous example is the discussion between de Gaulle and Norstad about the deployment of 
NATO forces in France that was recounted as follows: Norstad agreed, and made an extremely 
brilliant exposition, with his interallied staff in attendance. After congratulating him, the head of the 
French government asked the American general for a precise account of the deployment of nuclear 
weapons in France and of the targets assigned to them. Norstad: Sir, I can answer only if we are 
alone. So it be, said de Gaulle. The two staffs withdrew. So then? Then, sir, I cannot reply to your 
questions, to my very great regret... And de Gaulle in conclusion: General, that is the last time, and 
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In situations where all others are not strong enough to take the burden and 
the political risks, leadership by the strongest ally is demanded. However, even the US as 
the strongest power within NATO has to consider national restraints in its foreign and 
security policies, imposed not only by the economy but also by the constitution404, the 
congress405, the people, the media, and the academics. By contrast, Britain and France 
appear to face less national constraints: the British prime minister and the French 
president have stronger positions within the governments than the US president; 
furthermore, the British and the French people are more willing to act militarily and to 
suffer casualties, also in peace support operations. In the end, assuming that tendencies of 
virtual war406 do not create a new paradigm of real war, the appearance of the US forces 
as post-heroic forces407 puts doubts on the leadership role of the US.  
 
To sum up, NATO crises have had these leading elements in common: 
• national interests and domestic politics forced member states to pursue different 
objectives within NATO; 
• rhetoric did not always succeed in reconciling different positions; 
                                                 
 
make yourself understand it, that a responsible French leader will allow such an answer to be made 
(in Jordan, Norstad, p. 122). 
404 Because of constitutional reasons, the US could not, for example, support the European positions 
that Kosovo should stay within Serbia. 
405 Ignatieff, Michael, Virtual War. Kosovo and Beyond, New York: Metroolitan Books, 2000, p. 180. 
406 Ignatieff, Virtual War, pp. 161-215. 
407 Luttwak, Edward N., Toward Post-Heroic Warfare, in Strategy and Force Planning, ed. by 
Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College, Newport, pp. 419-429. As long as military 
objectives can be reached by post-heroic behavior, this is not supposed to be a matter of concern. 
However, collateral damages seem to be increased by this kind of warfare. See also Daalder/ 
OHanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 120-124. Ignatieff, Virtual War, pp. 186-187. 
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• mutual trust sometimes decreased in crises due to institutional restraints of the 
military commanders; 






With the British-French leadership in the CSDP, a paradigmatic shift in European 
strategy-making has occurred. Seen through the lense of Clausewitzs theory, the most 
important reasons for this paradigmatic shift are changes in the European balance-of-
power that provided Germany with more relative advantages than France or Britain, and 
the mismatch between strategic goals and military means in the latter states strategic 
concepts.  
With British and French leadership, the EU military forces will conduct military 
strategies for Non-Article 5 operations that contain early deployment408 of rapid reaction 
forces409 in joint operations. In contrast to NATO, the EU will put significantly more 
emphasis on the implementation of a broad security concept, combining military and 
civilian means very closely, also on the strategic level. This strategy runs in all the 
problems that Clausewitz connects with the offensive. The point of culmination is of 
utmost importance due to the limited amount of EU troops and assets. This implies the 
establishment of a special relationship with NATO as the more powerful European 
                                                 
408 In the Bosnia and Kosovo conflict, Britain and France made decisions to deploy forces 
significantly earlier than all the other European states and the US. 
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security institution. Thereby, the EU faces a strategic dilemma: on the one side, a 
successful EU will undermine the relevance of NATO as European security institution; 
on the other side, the EU definitely needs NATO even in the long term as a reassurance 
for escalation scenarios. 
Clausewitzs proposition of war as a continuation of policies and politics points 
out several areas of concern that are exemplified by NATO experience. EU member 
states may be dissatisfied with the political-military action of Britain and France as the 
military leader of the EU. In the EU, leadership must be compatible with the consensus 
principle in decision-making, sufficient participation of all member states, and the heroic 
behavior expectations even in those scenarios where British and French national interests 
are not that dominant.410 Furthermore, the EU military commanders ability to create and 
maintain trust will be facilitated if established as a supra-governmental institution.  
On the military level of strategy, important questions need to be answered in the 
concrete strategy-making processes. One main question is how far multinationality 
should go in the conduct of military operations. In line with Clausewitz, there is no 
general rule for determining up to what level multinationality is possible and effective in 
crisis operations. This has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the 
specific conditions under which a given crisis operation is carried out. This includes not 
only the area of operations with the opponent forces (and neutral states) but also the 
domestic situation of the member states that might differ from scenario to scenario.  
                                                 
 
409 To a certain degree, this compensates the Europeans deficiencies in high technology warfare that 
is most suitable in reacting to unacceptable actions opponents have already done. 
410 The neo-liberal and constructivist approach to multinational cooperation and EU strategy-making 
may help to prevent crises or to overcome them more rapidly. However, as the analysis shows, the 
strategic environment of the EU is definitely based on the traditional power-of-balance approach. 
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Evidently, multinationality must not weaken military effectiveness but rather 
strengthen it.411 In fact, armed forces deployed in peace support operations must possess 
the capability to fight battles. Nevertheless, as Clausewitz argues, combat power 
comprises not only the physical forces but also the strength of the political and military 
will to get engaged.412 And the will to get engaged is influenced by the legitimacy of 
military engagements that are likely to increase with the level of multinationality. 
Consequently, scenarios are imaginable in which a high level of multinationality is 
implemented although it decreases military effectiveness. Furthermore, multinationality 
has a favorable long-term perspective. Combined training, education, and conduct of 
operations are likely to increase the military efficiency significantly. However, in the 
foreseeable future, the degree of multinationality must respect Clausewitzs emphasis on 
the battle as the single means in war. If a crisis situation is likely to escalate to war, 
multinationality can only be conducted in inverse proportion to the intensity of the 
conflict. If combat power is necessary, multinationality will be less. If legitimacy is 
required and the situation is more permissive, multinationality will increase.  
The diversity of equipment in many European military forces definitely limits 
their interoperability. However, in peace support operations that are characterized by an 
uncertain and complex security environment, the strategic and operational headquarters 
of the EU can take advantage of choosing from a wide range of military assets and 
doctrines. On the other side, this simultaneously increases the complexity of strategic 
decisions and requires a high standard of education of the civilian and military personnel.  
                                                 
411 Rasmussen, Ingrid, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee Reports: Defense and security. 
Draft special report: Multinationality in crisis response operations, 22.09.2000 (www.nato-
pa.int/publications/comrep/2000/at-244-e.html2000, 10). 
412 Clausewitz, On War, p. 77. 
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Evidently, the degree of multinationality in a specific military operation requires a 
strategic decision on the political level of the EU. Politicians must make decisions quite 
early in order to gain time for the force generation process to be conducted on the 
strategic military level. Consequently, the proactive and offensive strategy of the EU puts 
the strategy-making processes on the political and military levels under the strictest time 
pressure. Recognizing Clausewitzs insights in the fascinating trinity, the EU strategists 
on the political and military levels finally have to put specific emphasis on policies, 
people, and time as major strategic dimensions. As the experience of NATO shows, 
crises are likely to emerge in this strategic triangle. 
If crises occur, political and military leaders should try to take advantage of them. 
In order to emerge in a more strengthened shape from a crisis, institutional procedures 
can be changed413, new strategic concepts developed, or reconciling rhetoric used.414 
Furthermore, trust established and maintained by the political and military leaders of the 
EU may help to prevent crises or to overcome them more rapidly. However, as the crises 
of NATO displayed, the EU must be aware of the negative impacts of rhetoric on 
strategy-making:  rhetoric in strategy-making might cause the mismatching of end and 
                                                 
413 This happened even during the Kosovo war when the alliances members agreed on a procedure to 
select targets that allowed quick decision-making without denying the nations right to veto. See 
Daalder/OHanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 123: ... the allies officially delegated their role in scrubbing 
target sets to Secretary-General Solana, who in turn allowed informal input from countries with 
particular interests and concerns in the targeting process, most notably the United States, Britain, and 
France. 
414 The successful management of a crisis definitely depends also on the enemys action. As Daalder 
and OHanlon argue, Perversely, Milosevic came to NATOs rescue. In a way that alliance leaders 
did not anticipate, he shored up their resolve and cohesion by his brutal treatment of the ethnic 
Albanians (Daalder/OHanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 19). 
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means. In NATO, this started with the forward defense in the 50s and found its most 
recent expression in the concrete fighting of war in Kosovo415. 
                                                 
415 See the alliances goals as formulated by president Clinton in Daalder/OHanlon, Winning Ugly, 
pp. 101-102. In general, the powerful rhetoric of human rights provides political objectives the public 
is expected to support while the willingness of governments, people and commanders to actually fight 
wars is decreasing. This might lead to a gap between high political objectives and limited willingness 
to use military means.   
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V.  FINAL REMARKS 
 
As a final chapter, some of the thesis conclusions are highlighted. First of all: 
Clausewitzs theory of war and strategy has the potential to establish the desirable 
European strategic paradigm. His writings may well provide the common theoretical 
framework in developing the strategic concept of the EU and its military strategies for 
specific scenarios. The superiority of Clausewitzs theory results from its 
comprehensiveness that is founded on exceptional personal experience and mind, broad 
historical evidence, and deep theoretical reflections including philosophy of science. 
Therefore, Clausewitz integrates the alternative concepts of his critics and competitors in 
a scientific approach that is more likely to meet the complexity of war. By this, he does 
not offer absolute prescriptive principles to direct politicians, officials, and commanders 
in their strategy-making. By contrast, the Prussian philosopher of war only provides 
intellectual tools that facilitate the analysis of war in general and specific military 
situations with regard to their dynamic strategic multidimensionality. With these, he 
prevents the military from establishing autonomous or elite strategic concepts that are 
justified by timeless military principles; instead, he makes war and strategy subject to 
the rational discourse of all social players involved, thus covering all dimensions of 
strategy-making. 
However, in order to take advantage of the fruitfulness of Clausewitzs scientific 
approach and his propositions on war and strategy, politicians, officials, and commanders 
must understand his theoretical writings properly. Strategy-makers, particularly, should 
prevent any selective readings of Clausewitzs On War. By contrast, strategy-makers are 
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encouraged to critically reflect upon their own strategic thinking by confronting it with 
Clausewitzs entire theory of war and strategy. To practice this critical method, two 
prerequisites are necessary: first, the proper education of strategists that includes the 
ability to critically reflect upon ones own strategic mind, and cooperation in the strategy-
making process that includes scholars with expertise in the theory and history of strategy-
making.  
With the European integration process, most reasons for differences between the 
British and the continental way of warfare and strategy have been abolished. Certainly, 
Britain has conducted the most radical shift in strategy-making. Implementing the 
indirect approach, Britain used to rely on time as an important strategic dimension of war. 
Naval supremacy and superior economic resources allowed Britain to wait for favorable 
military conditions. Today, by contrast, Britain has committed itself to a EU strategy that 
is focused on early deployment and long-lasting engagements of military forces. 
However, the British approach of indirectness finds a strong European expression in the 
broad security concept of the EU that comprises a wide spectrum of civilian means and 
coordinates them closely with the conduct of military operations at the strategic level. 
Furthermore, the EU benefits from the strong British political culture of political 
supremacy and inter-agency cooperation in strategy-making. Undoubtedly, the British 
approach is in line with the conclusions Clausewitz draws in his theoretical writings. 
Paradoxically, if the additional British tradition of trashing Clausewitz can be overcome, 
Britain has the capacity to prevent its EU partners from continuing to understand 
Clausewitz in the one-dimensional continental way that traditionally focuses more at the 
operational and tactical level of warfare. 
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 Strategically, the EU is both, a continental and a naval power. Tactically, the ERRF 
are designed as a corps-sized military formation enabled to conduct joint operations.   
However, because of the limited number of forces assigned to the EU, the capabilities for 
power projection are rather limited. Even if the EU military force strength is likely to be 
increased in the future, its military operations will depend on NATO for the foreseeable 
future. This is not so much because of the lack of planning capabilities or the technology 
gap but rather because of the necessity to be prepared for escalation scenarios. 
Consequently, EU strategy-makers need to establish strong institutional and personal 
links to NATO, thereby facing the dilemma of a successful EU undermining the 
relevance of NATO in the field of crisis management operations. 
Implementing the EU strategy-making as an inter-governmental and not supra-
governmental process, EU strategy-makers encounter enormous complexity. Like NATO, 
the EU will, most probably, face crises. The successful management of internal crises 
depends primarily on the leadership behavior of Britain and France; on the ability of the  
commander of the ERRF to create trust among the force contributing countries; and on 
the European identity of the people of the European states, including the soldiers. 
Nevertheless, the strong dependence on national policies and politics as well as the 
inexperienced co-leadership of Britain and France put a burden on the capability of the 
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